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Peoples, BCE, and
the Good Corporate "Citizen"
ED WAITZER* AND JOHNNY JASWAL**
This article considers the use of various legal instruments to advance a more expansive but
well-defined view of directors' duties and discretion-a view which focuses on the longer-
term interests of the corporation. We begin with an attempt to clarify the nature of directors'
statutory duties under Canadian corporate law. We then consider the recent decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples Department Stores Inc.-ITrustee of! v. Wise and
BCE v. 176 Debentureholders, in which the Court took a broad view of corporate purpose.
but failed to provide clear logic or operational guidance as to consequential directorial
respbnsibilities. As a result, the Court may have afforded directors increased deference, pro-
vided they comply with prescribed procedural steps, but without a clearly stated legal
rationale. We then outline various legal theories that courts might consider help advance
and clarify some of the concepts averted to by the Supreme Court and discuss opportuni-
ties for complementary legislative or shareholder-initiated reform.
Cet article examine le recours a divers instruments juridiques en vue de faire progresser
une perception plus expansive, mais bien d6finie, des devoirs et de [a discr6tion des admi-
nistrateurs - perception qui se concentre sur les int6r6ts Long terme de La Soci6t6. Pour
ce faire, nous commencons par essayer d'6lucider La nature des devoirs statutaires des
administrateurs aux termes du droit des Soci6t6s canadien. Ensuite, nous examinons Les
r6cents arr~ts de Ia Cour supr6me du Canada dans Peoples Department Stores Inc. ITrustee
of! c. Wise et BCE c. 1976 Debentureholders, dans lesquels La Cour percevait de mani~re
large l'objectif de [a Soci6t6, mais ne donnait aucune togique claire ou orientation op6ra-
tionnelle en mati~re de responsabilit6s corr6latives des administrateurs. Par cons6quent,
[a Cour peut avoir accord6 aux administrateurs une d6f6rence accrue, tant qu'its respec-
tent les 6tapes proc6durates prescrites, sans motifs l6gaux clairement 6nonc6s. Nous
exposons ensuite Les grandes lignes de diverses th6ories juridiques dont les tribunaux
pourraient 6ventuellement tenir compte pour contribuer 6 faire progresser et 6 expliciter
certains des concepts que La Cour supreme 6vite ; enfin, nous d6battons des occasions de
r6forme 16gislative compl6mentaire ou de r6forme engag6e par les actionnaires.
Jarislowsky Dimma Mooney Chair in Corporate Governance and Director of the Hennick
Centre for Business and Law, Osgoode Hall Law School and Schulich School of Business;
Senior Partner, Stikeman Elliott LLP.
JD/MBA (2009), Osgoode Hall Law School and Schulich School of Business, York
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being too far ahead ofyour time
is indistinguishable from being wrong
MANY OBSERVERS VIEW THE LAW AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP as remarkably self-
serving disciplines. Scholars and judges2 often find a way to ensure that "the law"
confirms the view they would otherwise favour for economic, social, or political
reasons. There are strong incentives built into the political process for those who
make laws to engage in and invite such circumlocution by, for example, being
purposefully general in the language they use to express concepts.
The broad theme of this article is that judges (by choice or by default) often
eschew clarity and favour ambiguity in the law in order to achieve desired out-
comes.3 This easily leads to confusion and unintended consequences. One area
where this ambiguity is apparent is the law surrounding proper corporate pur-
pose and the duties, discretion, and accountability of directors. Our goal ii this
article is not to advance a normative rationale for or against "good corporate
citizenship." Rather, our focus is on how courts and legislators have attempted
1. Harold S. Marks, "The Value of Predictions, or Where'd All This Rain Come From?"
(1993) 49 Fin. Anal. J. 6 at 7.
2. See e.g. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).
3. See e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, "Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law"
(1995) 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1733.
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to devise legal norms relating to directors' and corporate officers' duties in order
to advance a modest notion of corporate social responsibility within the tradi-
tional framework of corporate governance.
At the heart of such efforts lies the continuing debate on the obligation of
directors and officers to act in "the best interests of the corporation."' As dis-
cussed later in this article, translating this duty into clear, operational guidance
for directors lies at the heart of one of the great unresolved debates in corporate
law: whether the interests of the corporation are limited to those of its share-
holders, or whether they extend to the stakeholder constituencies that contribute
to, or are impacted by, the corporate enterprise. Suffice it to say at this juncture
that the Dickerson Committee, which recommended including such express
statutory language in the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), specifically
declined to offer guidance as to how the words "in the best interests of the corpo-
ration" should be interpreted. Instead, the Committee left this task to the courts,
expressing the view that its formulation would allow the courts to escape from the
constraints of the "anachronistic" view that has developed in the English courts.'
The Committee was referring to Laurence Gower's complaint that the English
courts viewed the best interests of the company as that of its shareholders.6
The Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision in BCE Inc. v. 1976 De-
bentureholders' illustrates the hazards of navigating this debate. In getting to a
decision that confirmed the prevailing view of the law, and seeking to clarify
its own reasons in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of9 v. Wise,8 the Court
managed to express some strikingly confusing views about the duties and ac-
countability of directors. The near-term result will likely be a diminution of the
latter. Likewise, the Court's casual references to good corporate "citizenship,"
in the absence of clear-headed analysis (or legislative norms), will likely serve pri-
marily to add procedural costs that ensure adequate legal cover for board deci-
sions, rather than create new norms and incentives to guide corporate conduct.
Many will welcome the BCE decision. Boards will take comfort in language
which suggests that, in the context of change of control transactions, their duty
4. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 122(1)(a) [CBCA].
5. Robert W.V. Dickerson et al., Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, vol.
1 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at para. 241 [Dickerson Report].
6. L.C.B. Gower, The Principles ofModern Company Law, 3d ed. (London: Stevens, 1969) at 522.
7. [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 [BCEI.
8. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 [Peoples].
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to act in the best interests of the corporation may be discharged by taking rea-
sonable steps to maximize shareholder value. They will also welcome the broad
discretion which BCE appears to confer on them to determine what is in the
best interests of the corporation, should they choose to take a course other than
maximizing short-term shareholder value. Because of the breadth of effect that
the Court has accorded to the concept of the business judgment rule, it will be
difficult for corporate stakeholders, including shareholders, to challenge direc-
tors' conduct so long as they act in a reasoned and informed manner.
Non-shareholder stakeholders and advocates of corporate social responsi-
bility will welcome the Court's discussion of directors being required "to act in
the best interests of the corporation viewed as a good corporate citizen."9 They
will also applaud the Court's statement that the fiduciary duty of directors is not
confined to short-term profit or share value. Rather, "where the corporation is
an ongoing concern, [the fiduciary duty] looks to the long-term interests of the
corporation."
10
BCE provided the Supreme Court with a rare opportunity to articulate and
clarify its view with respect to proper corporate purpose and the responsibilities of
directors. To do so meaningfully would have required more careful elaboration
on stakeholder theory, the director-centric governance model, and attendant ac-
countability mechanisms. instead, unreasoned discourse, especially by the Court,
is likely to be interpreted to provide something for everyone, which may mean
too little for anyone.1 Put another way, BCE can be read as stating that the best
interests of the corporation are the interests of those stakeholders that a particu-
lar board deems most worthy of protection, provided that due process is adhered
to in the selection of which stakeholder interests to favour. It is unlikely that this
is what the Court had in mind, rendering its reasoning somewhat suspect.
Part I of this article reviews the history of ambiguity in the assessment of
directors' duties and accountability. Specifically, Part I examines the extent of
9. BCE, supra note 7 at para. 81.
10. Ibid. at para. 38.
11. Ronald J. Daniels & Randall Morck, Corporate Decision-Making in Canada (Calgary:
University of Calgary Press, 1995) at 8. See also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
Easterbrook and Fischel recount that: "A manager told to serve two masters (a little for the
equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to
neither. Faced with a demand from either group, the manager can appeal to the interelts of
the other" (at 38).
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uncertainty and public policy debate surrounding the duty of loyalty and good
faith, the duty of care, and the business judgment rule, focusing particularly
on Anglo-American law. Part II of the article focuses on judicial circumlocution
as to the role and accountability of directors in BCE. In Part III, various well-
developed legal theories are presented that a court might invoke to meaningfully
elaborate the role of directors. In particular, we consider the integration, of trust
law principles into corporate law, the team production approach to corporate
law, moral stakeholder theory as a normative principle of corporate govern-
ance, the application of the common law duty to act reasonably, and prescribing
"enhanced" directors' duties in specified circumstances. In addition, statutory
reform and shareholder-initiated approaches towards focusing director account-
ability are canvassed. We briefly review some relevant precedents, domestic and
otherwise, to illustrate such approaches.
As we embark on a consideration of how such legal obligations might be
framed, the factors motivating increasing pressure for companies to be good
citizens are worth noting. At the simplest level, the lack of congruence between
those who take a narrow view of corporate social obligations (i.e., to comply
strictly with law) and the actual behaviour of corporate managers has beconle
strained. As discussed later in the article, it is obvious to any serious observer that
corporate managers are highly attentive to the interests of various constituencies
beyond those of current shareholders and are constantly weighing competing
interests. In this context, recognizing the limitations of legal norms, corporate
law has been structured to provide "managerial discretion to respond to social
and moral sanctions." 2 This approach has become particularly relevant in a world
characterized by connectedness and complexity. Globalization has eroded the
power of states to regulate large, multinational corporations 3 and market exter-
nalities." Likewise, the sheer complexity of contemporary social problems chal-
lenges their susceptibility to effective regulation through traditional, national legal
instruments. 5 In this environment, corporations (and other affected institutions)
must look further ahead and farther afield to achieve "sustainable" solutions.
12. Einer Elhauge, "Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest" (2005) 80 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 733 at 804.
13. Martin Wolf, "Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?" (2001) 80 Foreign Aff. 178.
14. Ca iCR7Stnstein, "Paradoxes of the Regulatory State" (1990) 57 U. Chicago L. Rev. 407.
15. See e.g. Gunther Teubner, "'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society" in
Gunther Teubner, ed., Global Law without a State (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth, 1997) at 3.
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I. STATUTORY DUTIES
Some of the confusion regarding the role and accountability of directors can be
traced to the conflation of directors' fiduciary and statutory duties. Canadian
corporate law imposes two basic duties on directors and officers: a duty of care
and a duty of loyalty and good faith, both of which are shaded by the "business
judgment rule." While both are often referred to collectively as "fiduciary duties,"
it is more typical for the "fiduciary" label to be applied only to the duty of loyalty
and good faith. For example, the Court in Peoples specifically referred to the duty
of loyalty (in contrast to the duty of care) as a "statutory fiduciary duty.
' 16
A. DUTY OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH
The statutory duty of loyalty and good faith arises out of subsection 122(1)(a)
of the CBCA, which provides that "every director and officer of a corporation
in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall act honestly and in
good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.
" ' 7
As Robert Flannigan has pointed out in a series of articles, a description of
tHis "duty of loyalty" as a fiduciary obligation is a mistaken characterization. The
functions of fiduciary duties are to control opportunism and to discipline self-
interested behaviour in those arrangements in which "an actor has access to the
assets of another for a defined or limited purpose."*8 The fiduciary accountability
of corporate directors and officers is established through their preferential access
to the assets of the corporation. Fiduciary duties are a narrow subset of the duty
of loyalty, embracing conflicts between the corporate duties of directors and their
personal interests. These typically arise in respect of corporate opportunities,
compensation, contracts in which a director or officer has a material interest,
and change of control transactions. The broader statutory duty of loyalty and
good faith imposes on directors and officers the obligation to not exceed their
authority and to exercise such authority "in the best interests of the corporation."
16. Peoples, supra note 8 at para. 32.
17. CBCA, supra note 4.
18. Robert Flannigan, "Fiduciary Duties of Shareholders and Directors" (May 2004) J. Bus. L.
277 at 281. See also by Flannigan, "The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability" (2004) 83
Can. Bar Rev. 35; "The Adulteration of Fiduciary Doctrine in Corporate Law" (2006) 122
Law Q. Rev. 449 [Flannigan, "The Adulteration of Fiduciary Doctrine"]; "Reshaping the
Duties of Directors" (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 365; and "Book Review: A Romantic
Conception of Fiduciary Obligation" (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 391.
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Considering the interests that directors must take into account in their decisions
is a distinct exercise from defining the beneficiaries of their fiduciary duties. Con-
flating the two issues necessarily involves either the expansion of fiduciary duties
or an erosion of the statutory duty of loyalty and good faith.
The mistaken description of the duty of loyalty and good faith as a "statutory
fiduciary duty" is exemplified in the drafting proposals of the Dickerson Report
which led to the CBCA." In characterizing the proposed duty as "a general
statutory formulation of the principles underlying the fiduciary relationship
between corporations and their directors, "20 the Dickerson Report referred to
earlier United Kingdom (UK)21 and Ontario law reform initiatives. 22 In fact, a
reading of the Ontario reform proposals suggests that the Select Committee on
Company Law (the Ontario Select Committee) may have been focusing on the
narrower "fiduciary" concern of directors foregoing their personal self-interest:
The law is clear as to what duties of good faith are owed by [a] director to the com-
pany arising from [the] fiduciary relationship.
... [T]he Committee has determined that it is not the director's fiduciary relation-
ship to the company which is unclear in the law, nor do the precise scope or nature
of his duties and responsibilities need clarification.
2 3
While this may be a charitable view of the Ontario Select Committee's
analysis, there is no basis for giving the Dickerson Report a similar benefit of
the doubt. Making it clear that the statutory provision was intended to embrace
common law and equitable principles, the Dickerson Report identified its pur-
pose as giving "statutory support to principles that are as difficult to apply as
they are well understood."24 By observing that the notion of the best interests of
the corporation left "the way free for directors to take into account whatever
factors they consider relevant in determining corporate policies, ' 25 they clearly
19. Dickerson Report, supra note 5.
20. Ibid. at 81.
21. U.K., Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee (London: Her Majesty's
Stationary Office, 1962).
22. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, "1967 Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company
Law" by Allan F. Lawrence in Sessional Papers, No. 5 (1967).
23. Ibid at 53.
24. Dickerson Report, supra note 5 at 81.
25. Ibid. at 82.
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had in mind a broader agency duty-one inconsistent with traditional fiduciary
obligations.
The resulting lack of clarity and accountability is not unique to Canadian
corporate law. Flannigan 26 traces how things went astray shortly after the House
of Lords' decision in Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver.27 That decision confirmed
that fiduciary regulation serves to control opportunism, indicating strict liability
of directors where a conflict exists (or a benefit is obtained) in the absence of
consent. In contrast, in the following month, the UK Court of Appeal in Re
Smith & Fawcett Ltd.28 combined the concept of fiduciary obligation with that
of "the best interests of the corporation." Describing the power to register share'
transfers as a "fiduciary power," Lord Greene stated that directors "must exercise
their discretion bona fide in what they consider-not what a court may con-
sider-is in the interests of the company, and not for any collateral purpose."29
Likewise, in Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd," in considering
whether directors had properly issued shares during a control contest, the Privy
Council saw fiduciary accountability as extending beyond the objective of con-
trolling opportunism. In rejecting the argument advanced on behalf of the di-
rectors (that the issuance of shares was not motivated by self-interest and was
within the authority of the board), Lord Wilberforce purported to expand the
scope of fiduciary accountability:
But it does not follow from this, as the appellants assert, that the absence of any ele-
ment of self-interest is enough to make an issue valid. Self-interest is only one, though
no doubt the commonest, instance of improper motive: and, before one can say that
a fiduciary power has been exercised for the purpose for which it was conferred, a wider
investigation may have to be made.
3 1
Nor is the confusion as to the distinction between fiduciary accountability
and determining the best interests of the corporation limited to Anglo-Canadian
jurisprudence. In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N. V v. Pathe Communications
Corp., in the context of deciding whether there was a-breach of fiduciary duties,
26. Robert Flannigan, "The Adulteration of Fiduciary Doctrine," supra note 18.
27." [1967] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.).
28. [1942 1 Ch. 304.
29. Ibid. at 306.
30. [1974] 1 A.C. 821.
31. Ibid. at 834.
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then-Chancellor Allen stated that "where a corporation is operating in the vicinity
of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk
bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise."32 While the decision was
initially interpreted to expand directors' duties to include creditors when a cor-
poration is in the so-called zone of insolvency, subsequent case law has clarified
that, rather than extending or expanding duties to creditors, it was intended to
create an additional shield for directors against shareholders claiming that the
company should have taken increased risks for their benefit.3 In the more re-
cent Foundation Inc. v. Gheewalla case, the Delaware Supreme Court made it
clear that duties are not owed directly to creditors, but that directors continue
to owe duties only to the corporate enterprise.3
The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the above-mentioned logic in Peo-
ples. By doing so under the rubric of fiduciary obligations (as in Credit Lyonnais),
it may have added to the confusion in Canada. In Peoples, Peoples Department
Stores Inc. (Peoples) had been acquired by a subsidiary of Wise Stores Inc. (Wise)
from Marks & Spencer Canada Inc. (M&S).35 The three Wise brothers were
directors of both Wise Stores Inc. and its new subsidiary. To protect amounts
due to M&S on account of the purchase price, the purchase agreement restricted
the amalgamation of the two corporations. 36 As a result, a joint procurement
program was established whereby Peoples did most of the purchasing and trans-
ferred to Wise inventory purchased on its behalf.3" When Peoples filed for bank-
ruptcy, its trustee claimed that the directors had breached their statutory duties
of loyalty and care to Peoples by implementing the joint procurement plan.
38
While the Court determined that directors do not have a fiduciary duty to
corporate creditors where the corporation is approaching insolvency,39 it framed
its analysis in terms of which stakeholder claims are entitled to consideration
by directors in determining "the best interests of the corporation."4 The Court
32. [1991] Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 at 108 [Credit Lyonnais].
33. Production Resources Group, L.L. C v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
34. 930 A.2d 92 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2007).
35. Peoples, supra note 8 at para. 8.
36. Ibid. at para. 11.
37. Ibid. at para. 18.
38. Ibid. at para. 23.
39. Ibid. at paras. 43-46.
40. Ibid. at paras. 41-47.
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rejected the notion that the best interests of the corporation means the best
interests of its shareholders and stated that the positions of other stakeholders,
including creditors (and not merely when a corporation approaches the zone of
insolvency), are entitled to consideration by directors:
It is clear that the phrase the "best interests of the corporation" should be read not
simply as the "best interests of the shareholders." ... [Iln determining whether they
are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate,
given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider,
inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, gov-
ernments and the environment.41
The Court cited with approval the view of Justice Berger in Teck Corp. v. Millar
I appreciate that it would be a breach of their duty for directors to disregard entirely
the interests of a company's shareholders... . But if they observe a decent respect for
other interests lying beyond those of the company's shareholders in the strict sense,
that will not, in my view, leave directors open to the charge that they have failed in
their fiduciary duty to the company.
4 2
The stakeholder debate is an important and timely one but the Court may
have done a disservice by characterizing it as an issue of fiduciary obligation.
Having done so, the Court found that both Peoples and Wise had consented to
the conflicting duties that the directors owed to each of them. The Court found
that the evidence indicated no favouritism. Rather, it demonstrated that the de-
fendant directors had been solely motivated to resolve the problem of managing
inventories efficiently.4 3 As a result, the Court concluded that there was no fiduci-
ary breach. By treating the issue as whether directors owed a fiduciary obligation
to creditors, as opposed to determining whether the directors had breached their
statutory duty to the corporation, the Court managed to extricate itself from
the "proper purpose" analysis by arguing that creditors (and presumably other
stakeholders) had other remedies, such as oppression and negligence, available
to them. Indeed, the Court found that the availability of "a broad oppression
remedy undermines any perceived need to extend the fiduciary duty imposed
on directors...."4
41. Ibid. at para. 42.
42. [1972] 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288 at para. 97 (B.C. S.C.) [Teck Corp.].
43. Supra note 8 at paras. 40-41.
44. Ibid. at para. 51.
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Having mischaracterized the issue as one of fiduciary accountability, the
Supreme Court might have resolved it by finding no evidence of bad faith or
negligence. Instead, while observing that directors' fiduciary liability is strict,
4 5
the Court immediately stepped back from that position to assert that "all the
circumstances may be scrutinized to determine whether the directors and officers
have acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation."" The Court further stated that "the subjective motivation of the
director ... is the central focus of the statutory fiduciary duty."
4 7
It is not clear how the Court reconciled "subjective motivation" or scrutiny
of "all the circumstances" with strict liability. Nor is it evident how wading into
the stakeholder debate was relevant to the issue of fiduciary accountability. Doing
so arguably imported the oppression analysis and further diluted the concept
of fiduciary accountability: if complainants must produce evidence of improper
motivation or culpability "in the circumstances," the likelihood of a court find-
ing directors in breach of their "fiduciary" duty is substantially diminished.48
B. DUTY OF CARE
A review of how the law has evolved with respect to the duty of care further
highlights the hazards of ambiguity.
The statutory duty of care arises out of subsection 122(1)(b) of the CBCA,
which provides that "every director and officer of a corporation, in exercising
their powers and discharging their duties, shall ... exercise the care, diligence
and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circum-
stances.
The common law standard of directorial care was subjective and, viewed in
hindsight, remarkably low. Its classic articulation is found in Re City Equitable
Fire Insurance Company Limited.9 In effect, the common law standard did not
45. Ibid. at para. 39.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid. at para. 63.
48. For a more detailed discussion of the frailties of Peoples, see Ian B. Lee, "Peoples Department
Stores v. Wise and the 'Best Interests of the Corporation"' (2005) 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 212;
Mohamed F. Khimji, "Peoples v. Wise- Conflating Directors' Duties, Oppression and
Stakeholder Protection" (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 209; and Darcy L. MacPherson,
"Supreme Court Restates Directors' Fiduciary Duty - A Comment on Peoples Department
Stores v. Wise" (2005) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 383.
49. (1924), [1925] 1 Ch. 407 (C.A.).
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require of directors (as it did of others under the general law of negligence) the
standard of the "reasonable person." This approach was rejected by each of the
Ontario Select Committee and the Dickerson Report.
The Ontario Select Committee recommended that the common law stan-
dard of care be elevated to an objective test, requiring that directors exhibit the
"degree of care, diligence, and skill [of a] reasonably prudent director in compa-
rable circumstances.""0 The language ultimately adopted in the Ontario Business
Corporations Act (OBCA) extends the test to officers, as well as directors, and
measures their conduct against that of a "reasonably prudent person," rather
than that of a "reasonably prudent director," in comparable circumstances.
5 1
While the use of the word "person" instead of "director" might have been
intended as a conforming change, given the extension of the duty to officers as
well as directors, it was also viewed as a diminution of the proposed standard
from that of a "director" (connoting some degree of expertise or professional-
ism) to that of a "reasonably prudent person." This was the conclusion of the
Federal Court of Appeal 2 in construing virtually identical language in subsection
227.1(3) of the Income Tax Act."3 That court found the reference to a reasonably
prudent (versus skilled) person suggested an objective standard of competence,
while the inclusion of the phrase "in comparable circumstances" introduced a
subjective element. Accordingly, it concluded that the language in subsection
227.1(3) created a hybrid test:
It is not enough for a director to say he or she did his or her best, for that is an invo-
cation of the purely subjective standard. Equally clear is that honesty is not enough.
However, the standard is not a professional one. Nor is it the negligence law standard
that governs these cases. Rather, the Act contains both objective elements--embodied
in the reasonable person language-and subjective elements, inherent in individual
considerations like "skill" and the idea of "comparable circumstances." Accordingly,
the standard can be properly described as "objective subjective.
" 
5
Like the Ontario Select Committee, the Dickerson Report sought to raise
the common law standard of care in its proposed statutory codification. 5 As it
50. Supra note 22 at para. 7.2.3.
51. Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 134(1) [OBCA].
52. Soper v. Canada (1998), 1 F.C. 124 at para. 38 (C.A.) [Soper].
53. Income TaxAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 227.1(3).
54. Soper, supra note 52 at para. 41.
55. Dickerson Report, supra note 5 at para. 242.
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noted, "it is ... cold comfort to a shareholder to know that there is a steady
supply of marginally competent people available under present law to manage
his investment."56 Although the Dickerson Report did not propose the phrase
"in comparable circumstances," it was included by the legislative drafters. At
least until Peoples, this was viewed by many (including the Federal Court of
Appeal) as preserving the common law subjectivity of the duty of care.
Arguably, such ambiguity was put to rest by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Peoples. With respect to the specific issue, the Court made it clear that the
standard had been raised to an objective contextual one:
The main difference is that the enacted version includes the words "in comparable
circumstances," which modifies the statutory standard by requiring the context in
which a given decision was made to be taken into account. This is not the introduc-
tion of a subjective element relating to the competence of the director, but rather the
introduction of a contextual element into the statutory standard of care.
57
As a result, the duty of care imposed on directors would appear to be identical
to that imposed on all other persons.
In reaching that result, however, the Court may have created new uncer-
tainty. Their reference to the introduction of a "contextual element" into the
statutory standard of care is not clear. According to the Court "the contextual
approach dictated by s. 122(1)(b) of the CBCA not only emphasizes the primary
facts but also permits prevailing socio-economic conditions to be taken into
consideration."
5 8
The Court did not elaborate on the relevance of such socio-economic con-
ditions, or how they might be taken into account by directors in their decision
making or by judges exercising their discretion in adjusting liability standards
after the fact. Nor did it reflect on the justiciability of such issues. Instead, the
Court took an expansive view of the scope of directors' duty of care:
[U] nlike the statement of the fiduciary duty in s. 122(1)(a) of the CBCA, which specifies
that directors and officers must act with a view to the best interests of the corporation,
the statement of the duty.of care in s.122(1)(b) of the CBCA does not specifically re-
fer to an identifiable party as the beneficiary of the duty. ... Thus the identity of the
56. Ibid. at para. 242.
57. Peoples, supra note 8 at para. 62.
58. Ibid. at para. 64.
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beneficiary of the duty of care is much more open-ended, and it appears obvious that
it must include creditors.
59
As Christopher Nicholls points out, it appears that the Court may have con-
flated two different concepts-the tort "duty of care," which anticipates many
beneficiaries, and the statutory duty of care. Nicholls argues that it is difficult to
understand why a corporate statute would impose additional personal duties on
directors other than to the corporation itself.6"
It has been suggested that this reasoning of the Court was based on the civil
law of Quebec.61 This raises interesting issues with respect to the consistent
interpretation of the CBCA, a federal statute, particularly in the context of inter-
pretation by a civil law court.
Ontario has subsequently amended the OBCA to add the italicized words:
134(1): Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising his or her powers
and discharging his or her duties to the corporation shall,
a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corpora-
tion; and
b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would ex-
ercise in comparable circumstances.
62
In analyzing the Court's language in Peoples, it is interesting to consider
whether a broader duty of care, theoretically owed to a diverse, undefined group
of stakeholders, might serve to defeat the object of the duty of loyalty, thereby
creating further confusion and leading to suboptimal board decision making.
For example, would well-advised directors eschew risks for fear of attracting
creditor liability, even when doing so sacrifices corporate opportunity? If so,
Peoples would serve to encourage self-interested conduct (i.e., the mitigation of
exposure to personal liability). This concern has been specifically raised in the
context of court-supervised reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditor Arrangement Act.63 For this reason,
59. Ibid. at para. 57.
60. Christopher C. Nicholls, Corporate Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005) at 298-99.
61. Bruce L. Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles, 3d ed. (London, ON:
Scribblers Publishing, 2006) at 331, n. 115. Both Peoples and BCEwere considered by the
Supreme Court on appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal.
62. OBCA, supranote51, s. 134.
63. Stephanie Ben-lshai & Catherine Nowak, "The Threat of the Oppression Remedy to
Reorganizing Insolvent Corporations" (2008) Ann. Insolv. Rev. 429. The authors consider
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Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Catherine Nowak recommend that the oppression
remedy should not be available for use by stakeholders of a corporation once it
has entered into a court-supervised reorganization proceeding.
Of late, such concerns have risen to the forefront. Increasingly, directors
focus on the personal consequences of board service, both in their deliberations
(which tend to be highly process driven) and in their aversion to making higher-
risk decisions (which are often characteristic of longer-term strategies). The
consequences for firms, as well as for systemic innovation and competitiveness,
are alarming.
C. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
One final aspect of Peoples merits comment. Peoples was the first instance in
which the Supreme Court of Canada specifically considered and validated the
"business judgment rule."
In the United States, courts have formalized the "business judgment rule"
as a standard of conduct which, if adhered to, insulates the board from judicial
review of their actions. A classic US case is Shlensky v. Wrigley, in which the
plaintiff challenged the Wrigley board's refusal to install lights at Wrigley Field
when every other major league baseball team played night games." The board
defended its actions based on the preferences of Wrigley's majority owner-
that baseball is a day game and that lighting the stadium would damage the
surrounding community. The court granted the board's motion to dismiss,
relying on the "business judgment rule" to preclude the plaintiffs from even
inquiring into the basis for the board's decision.
Assuming a board acts in good faith, on an informed basis, in a manner in
which it believes is in the best interest of the corporation, and is neither wasteful
(in the narrow sense of an activity amounting to "corporate waste") nor engaged
in self-interested conduct, it is afforded wide latitude by the US courts under
the shield of the business judgment rule.6" The presumption of judicial defer-
ence to the judgment of directors may be rebutted if any of the above-noted
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S., 1985, c. B-3; Companies' Creditors Arrangement.Act,
R.S., 1985, c. C-36.
64. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (111. App. 1968).
65. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1984); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119
(Del. Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp., 126 A.2d 46 (Del. Ch. 1924);
Puma v. Marriot, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971).
454 120091 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
conditions are not satisfied, in which case the burden shifts to the directors to
show that their actions were rational and taken in good faith. Self-interested
conduct in the context of control transactions results in the application of a
more stringent "entire fairness" test.66
Former Chancellor William T. Allen finds the business judgment rule jus-
tified, within the overall context of liability provisions, as intending to protect
shareholders by encouraging boards to take risks for their benefit.67 Einer Elhauge
provides a more socially-focused rationale, suggesting that allowing managerial
discretion may serve to subject corporate decisions to the same social and moral
processes that apply to sole proprietors.68
In practice, the business judgment rule has provided a broad shield. Well-
advised boards should always have a carefully-prepared record to ensure that the
rule's protection trumps any statutory duty claim. For example, boards have been
protected in taking actions that deliberately benefit creditors at the expense of
shareholders, so long as the decision was based in facts, well considered, in good
faith, and not conflicted by any personal interests of a majority of directors.69
Canadian jurisprudential deference to the business judgment rule is less de-
veloped. In CWShareholdings v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd.,
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice explained that the rule:
[O]perates to shield from court intervention business decisions which have been made
honestly, prudently, in good faith and on reasonable grounds. In such cases, the board's
decision will not be subject to microscopic examination and the court will be reluctant
to interfere and usurp the board of directors' function in managing the corporation.
7
0
The rule was referred to by the Supreme Court in Peoples as follows:
Business decisions must sometimes be made, with high stakes and under considerable
time pressure, in circumstances in which detailed information is not available. It might
66. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985) [Unocal]..
67. See William T. Allen, "Modern Corporate Governance and the Erosion of the Business
Judgement Rule in Delaware Corporate Law" (Osgoode Hall Law School, Comparative
Research in Law and Political Economy (CLPE), Research Paper No. 06/2008), online:
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract= 1105591 >. Allen was Chancellor of the Court of Chancery
of the State of Delaware.
68. Elhauge, supra note 12 at 844.
69. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics (New York: Foundation Press,
2002) at 414-15.
70. [1998] 39 O.R. (3d) 755 at para. 57.
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be tempting for some to see unsuccessful business decisions as unreasonable or impru-
dent in light of information that becomes available ex post facto. Because of this risk of
hindsight bias, Canadian courts have developed a rule of deference to business deci-
sions called the "business judgment rule," adopting the American name for the rule.
7 1
Since at least Teck Corp., 2 Canadian courts, in the absence of conflicts of
interest or patently flawed process, have been reluctant to second-guess or impose
liability on directors. This may have been an acknowledgement that setting the
standard of review too low would discourage board service and risk-taking. For
reasons discussed below, BCE may serve either to enshrine an overly broad for-
mulation of the business judgment rule, or cast doubt on its relevance and utility.
Neither of these outcomes is desirable.
II. THE BCE DECISION
Those who follow Canadian corporate law eagerly awaited the Supreme Court
of Canada's reasons in BCE. Given the uncertainty surrounding directors' duties
(exacerbated by the Court in Peoples) there was a general expectation that the
Court might use the opportunity to revisit and distinguish (or otherwise clarify)
its earlier reasoning. Instead, it created additional uncertainty with respect to the
manner in which the "fairness" test for a Plan of Arrangement and the oppression
remedy will be applied, as well as adding to the confusion surrounding directors'
duties and the indeterminate nature and scope of their agency obligations.
The facts in BCE involved a leveraged buyout-which, at the time, would
have been the largest of its kind-that was to have been effected by a Plan of Ar-
rangement under the CBCA (the Arrangement). While it did not purport to
-arrange the legal rights of bondholders of Bell Canada (a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of BCE), certain bondholders contested the fairness of the Arrangement and
brought an oppression claim. The trial judge dismissed such claims, finding the
Arrangement to be in the best interests of BCE and Bell Canada.
3
The Quebec Court of Appeal unanimously overturned the trial decision,
finding that the Arrangement had not been shown to be fair and that it should
not have been approved. The Court of Appeal found that the BCE board of
71. Peoples, supra note 8 at para. 64.
72. Supra note 42.
73. BCEInc., Re, [2008] R.J.Q. 1097,43 B.L.R. (4th) 1 (Q.C.S.).
74. BCE Inc., Re, [2008] 43 B.L.R. (4th) 157, 2008 QCCA 935.
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directors (the Board) was under a duty to consider whether the Arrangement
could have been structured in a way that provided a satisfactory price for share-
holders, while avoiding, or at least mitigating, the adverse effect on bondholders.
In the absence of such efforts, the Court of Appeal determined that BCE had
not discharged its onus of showing that the Arrangement was fair and reasonable.
In doing so, the Court of Appeal ignored the trial judge's specific findings that
the Board had, in fact, considered the interests of bondholders. Given its tenuous
connection to the factual record, the Court of Appeal's decision was troubling
because it suggested a substantive objection that it was not sufficient merely to
have considered extra-contractual interests. Rather, the Board should have done
something about them. Absent a legal entitlement that could be clearly articu-
lated, the Quebec Court of Appeal left unanswered how a board might go about
striking a satisfactory and legally justifiable balance.
On a remarkably expedited basis, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the
appeal and unanimously reversed the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal.
In its reasons, the Court reinstated key findings of the trial judge, rejecting the
bondholder claims that the transaction was oppressive, and confirming that BCE
had satisfied the fairness test required for court approval of the Arrangement.
In analyzing the manner in which the "fairness" test for a Plan of Arrange-
ment will be applied, the Court noted that the scope of judicial inquiry is gen-
erally confined to legal rights. The Court rejected the "fair and reasonable" test
by which courts previously reserved the discretion to rule against an arrangement,
notwithstanding shareholder approval thereof."5 Instead, and absent extraordinary
circumstances (not found in this case and, therefore, presumably not simply a
diminution in the market value of a complainant's securities), the Court articu-
lated a narrower test for approval, i.e., whether (i) the arrangement has a valid
business purpose and (ii) the objections of those whose legal rights are being
arranged have been resolved in a fair and balanced way. The Court recognized
that "there is no such thing as a perfect arrangement," and that, "although Board
decisions are not subject to microscopic examination with the perfect vision of
hindsight, they are subject to examination. " 76 The valid business purpose prong
of the test suggests an inquiry by the Court into specific facts and the degree of
75. BCE's common shareholders approved the Arrangement by a vote of over 97 per cent. See
BCE, supra note 7 at para. 161.
76. UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. UPM-KymmeneMiramichi Inc., [2002] 214 D.L.R. (4th) 496 at
para. 153, cited in BCE, supra note 7 at para. 155.
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necessity of the arrangement. The fair .balancing prong looks at a number of
factors, including requisite shareholder approval.
It remains to be seen whether this two-part test will facilitate arrangements
or be used by courts as a mechanism to second-guess shareholder votes, when
they are so inclined, for equitable reasons. Moreover, as noted, the Court's rea-
sons imply a "necessity test" in order to effect a transaction by way of an ar-
rangement. In this case, the Court determined, without any elaboration, that
such necessity was established.
The Court also set out a two-pronged test for its analysis of the oppression
remedy. A complainant is required to establish that (i) it had a reasonable ex-
pectation, (ii) which was unfairly disregarded. 7 The Court found the concept
of reasonable expectations to be objective and contextual, in that "the question
is whether the expectation is reasonable having regard to the facts of the specific
case, the relationships at issue, and the entire context, including the fact that
there may be conflicting claims and expectations."7 8 It went on to suggest that,
where there is a conflict between the views of stakeholders, each is entitled to
reasonably expect fair treatment. In resolving conflicts, the Court found that a
board owes a duty to the corporation, not to a particular group of stakeholders,
and that the reasonable expectations of stakeholders dictate that the directors
act in a disinterested and impartial manner, free from conflict of interest, and
in the best interests of the corporation.
The Court elaborated various useful factors for determining whether reason-
able expectations exist, including general commercial practice, the nature of the
corporation, the relationship between the parties, past practice, steps the claimant
could have taken to protect itself, representations and agreements, and the fair
resolution of the conflicting interests of different stakeholders. 9 With respect-to
the last factor, while the Court noted that directors can resolve conflicts between
different stakeholder groups in a way that favours one group at the expense of
another, it articulated a cornerstone of fair treatment, stating that "the corpora-
tion and shareholders are entitled to maximize profit and share value, to be sure,
but not by treating individual stakeholders unfairly."8" BCE fails to provide guid-
77. BCE, ibid at para. 56.
78. Ibid. at para. 62.
79. Ibid. at paras. 69-84.
80. Ibid. at para. 64.
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ance as to when permissible favouritism crosses the line into unfairness.
The Court's approach to the oppression remedy illustrates the circular logic
of its reasoning. Reasonable expectations arguments are, by their nature, some-
what circular, insofar as expectations are likely to reflect extant legal norms.
To compound (or confound) the problem, the Court, in effect, suggests that
reasonable expectations can be breached, so long as doing so is not unfair. This
challenges the law since Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd.,8 1 under which
"reasonable expectations" have defined fairness. Moreover, in setting out several
factors for determining the reasonableness of expectations, the Court may have
changed their relative significance. For example, did th6 Court, in listing the
existence of a contract alongside other factors, intend to diminish its relative
importance? More generally, by touching on various theories of what might
form the basis of a judicially recognized "reasonable expectation," the Court
created uncertainty as to the assessment of such claims.
82
The Court's analysis of how a board should weigh "the fair resolution of
conflicting interests between corporate stakeholders" appears to link oppression
to the duty of loyalty owed by directors, and notes that "reasonable expectations"
are now relevant to such duty.83 It stated that "directors, acting in the best in-
terests of the corporation, may be obliged to consider the impact of their deci-
sions on corporate stakeholders... . However, the directors owe a fiduciary duty
to the corporation, and only to the corporation." 84 Earlier in its reasons, the
Court asserted that "this case does involve the fiduciary duty of the directors to
the corporation, and particularly the 'fair treatment' component of that duty,
which ... is fundamental to the reasonable expectations of stakeholders claim-
ing an oppression remedy." 85 However, merging the dut of loyalty (owed to
the corporation) with the oppression remedy (intended to redress personal harm
to a security holder, creditor, director, or officer of a corporation) has resulted
in uncertainty as to both.
81. [1973] A.C. 360 (H.L.).
82. Jeffrey G. Maclntosh, "Unsafe at Any Speed: BCE and the Peoples' Corporate Law" The
National Post Financial Post (9 June 2008), online: <http://network.nationalpost.com/np/
blogs/fpcomment/archive/2008/06/9/unsafe-at-any-speed-bce-and-the-peoples-corporate-
law.aspx>.
83. BCE, supra note 7.
84. Ibid. at para. 66.
85. Ibid. at para. 36.
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In effect, BCE appears to denote thai fair treatment in respect of alleged
corporate or personal harms is whatever stakeholder groups are entitled to rea-
sonably expect, without further elaboration on the nature (or reasonableness)
of such expectations or the distinction among various remedies. 6 The Court
appears to designate the board as a referee and-so long as it is not conflicted
and observes appropriate process-to afford it the protection of an extraordinarily
expansive business judgment rule.
The Court's fiduciary duty analysis is the most problematic aspect of the
case. The Court stated that "the content of the duty varies with the situation
at hand."87 It relegated the duty of loyalty to one of the listed factors to be con-
sidered in the context of considering oppression relief, i.e., entailing a factual
"fairness" determination rather than a determination of whether a decision was
made on a good faith basis. In this context, the Court had held in Peoples that
the fiduciary duty is'a duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, which
may include considering the impact of corporate decisions on particular stake-
holders. In BCE, reaffirming Peoples, the Court went on to speak of an affirma-
tive "fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a
good corporate citizen."88 In resolving conflicting interests, the Court held that
there is "no principle that one set of interests ... should prevail over another set
of interests. Everything depends on the particular situation faced by the direc-
tors and whether ... they exercise business judgment in a responsible way."89
Such observations are unhelpful in clarifying norms of directorial conduct. The
Supreme Court also noted that the "fiduciary duty" of the directors to the corpo-
ration is not confined to short-term profit or share value: "Where the corporation
is an ongoing concern, it looks to the long-term interests of the corporation. "90
86. For an interesting and somewhat prescient contextual analysis that was written after the
Supreme Court's decision and in anticipation of its reasons, see Peer Zumbansen & Simon
Archer, "The BCE Decision: Reflections on the Fiim as a Contractual Organization"
(Osgoode Hall Law School, Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy (CLPE),
Research Paper No. 17/2008), online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id
1160094>. For a discussion of how BCE further confuses derivative and personal actions,
see Maclntosh, supra note 82.
87. BCE, supra note 7 at para. 38.
88. Ibid. at para. 81. The concept of corporate "citizenship" is a non-sequitur which the Court
did not explain or elaborate on.
89. Ibid. at para. 84.
90. Ibid. at para. 38.
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Although the stakeholder debate is an important and timely one, the Court
may have done it a disservice by characterizing its premise as an issue of fiduci-
ary obligation. The challenge of judicial monitoring of competing stakeholder
interests is even more daunting than that of monitoring shareholder value maxi-
mization. Judges are ill-suited to either task.
BCE also adds uncertainty to the nature and scope of directors' agency ob-
ligations. Looking to the facts of the case, the Court vindicated the trial judge.
The Court found that the evidence both supported a reasonable expectation that
the Board would consider the position of the bondholders and that it did, in fact,
consider their interests in an appropriate manner, given the circumstances. The
repeated references to the interests and fair treatment of stakeholders, and to
long-term good corporate citizenship, suggest a rejection of the Delaware model.
The Delaware model expressly recognizes and explicitly resolves the conflict
that directors face in a change of control context, establishing, as principles,
that, once a board of directors makes a decision to sell a company, they (i) have
a duty to maximize the value that shareholders receive, and (ii) are subject to an
intermediate standard of review. The consequence of this standard is that direc-
torial decisions receive less deference than under the normal business judgment
rule.91 That said, having framed the issue in terms of stakeholder theory (in
contrast to a duty to maximize value for shareholders while respecting obliga-
tions to other stakeholders), the Court in BCE provided no guidance as to the
priority of any constituency claims, other than to suggest that boards must focus
on the best interests of the corporation. For example, the Court did not address
the treatment of preferred shareholders because it was not called upon to do so.
In Palmer v. Carling OKeefe Breweries of Canada Ltd.,92 the Ontario Divisional
91. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1986).
Subsequent Delaware cases have addressed fact-specific issues concerning how directors
should approach value maximization when selling a company. In each of Maple Leaf Foods
Inc. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] 42 O.R. (3d) 177 and Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real
Estate Investment Trust (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 254, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that,
when there is a change of control, directors should take reasonable steps to maximize
shareholder value. Other Canadian courts have taken a similar view. This principle is also
reflected in Canadian Securities Administrators, "Notice of National Policy 62-202," online:
<http://www.osc.gov.on.calen/SecuritiesLaw-pol-19970704-62-202-fnp.jsp> (stating that:
"The primary objective of the take-over provisions of Canadian securities legislation is the
protection of the bona fide interests of the shareholders of the target company").
92. (1989), 67 O.R. (2d) 161.
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Court effectively protected such shareholders by holding that the directors' duty
is to act in the best interests of shareholders as a whole, including holders of
preferred shares. BCE, on the other hand, posits preferred shareholders as just
another stakeholder group whose interests (arguably more akin to debt than to
common equity) must be balanced.
Even the questions of whether directors may consider, should consider, or
are ob liged to consider stakeholder interests, and, if so, at what point, were not
addressed clearly by the Court. Early in its reasons, it noted that, in Peoples,
"this Court found that although directors must consider the best interests of the
corporation, it may also be appropriate, although not mandatory, to consider
the impact of corporate decisions on shareholders or particular groups of stake-
holders."93 Later, the Court stated that "the duty of directors to act in the best
interests of the corporation comprehends a duty to treat individual stakeholders
... equitably and fairly."'" Is this duty mandatory?
Having waded into stakeholder theory, the Court retreated, without so
acknowledging. In searching for an accountability mechanism, it recognized as
a practical matter that, with a change of control being imminent, the Board had
a duty to maximize value for shareholders. At the same time, it stated that the US
Revlon duty does not displace the fundamental rule that the duty of directors
cannot be confined to particular priority rules. This reasoning was buttressed by
the Court's holding that the buy-out would have a beneficial impact on BCE.
Absent any finding of conflict of interest or bad faith, and providing that the
Board's decisions were within a range of reasonable choices it could have made,
the Court was not prepared to exercise hindsight as to whether the Board's de-
cision was the perfect one.
In effect, by deferring to directors' determinations on resolving conflicts be-
tween stakeholder groups in a fair manner that reflects the best interests of the
corporation, the Court appears to have broadened the jurisprudential relevance
and protection that is afforded by the business judgment rule. What previously
afforded protection from directorial negligence now extends, arguably, to the
determination of directors' statutory duties and whose interests should, may, or
must be considered in resolving conflicts in a "fair manner."95 Taking the Court's
93. BCE, supra note 7 at para. 39 [emphasis in original].
94. Ibid. at para. 82.
95. Alternately, the context may have supported a conclusion that shareholders had a reasonable
expectation in a sale of control that the board would act to maximize value for them.
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logic to its extreme, boards would be accorded broader deference than adminis-
trative tribunals. In the case of the Ontario Securities Commission, this was re-
cently held to include "the right to be wrong"96 (but, in the case of boards, this
would presumably not include the right to be "unfair," whatever that may mean).
This development may reflect a fundamental divergence of Canadian and
US legal norms with respect to judicial review of directors' conduct. For example,
in contrast to the "entire fairness test,""7 which informs judicial review of direc-
tors' conduct in the United States (at least when self-interest is alleged), Cana-
dian courts have tended to defer to process-oriented requirements" imposed by
securities regulators, largely in response to the historical prevalence of controlled
public companies in Canada. Securities regulation, in effect, has occupied the
field, leaving the courts less inclined to invoke the extraordinary breadth of
the oppression remedy in the face of self-interested or change of control trans-
actions.
Conversely, the Court's reasoning may allow for a contrary position to be
argued as well. By engaging in a detailed review of the factual circumstances,
the Court may be interpreted to be paying lip-service to the business judgment
rule or to be using it as a device to extricate itself from the analytical swamp it
had waded into. Such a lack of deference, and an implied willingness to second-
guess director decisions made with care and in good faith, suggests a radical
narrowing of the business judgment rule!
While many had hoped that BCE would be the Supreme Court's opportu-
nity to clarify and narrow some of the open-ended pronouncements in Peoples,
one can speculate about a range of fact situations in respect of which the law
may now be highly uncertain. How does a board of directors deal with a bidder
whose stated intentions may be prejudicial to non-shareholder constituencies
when the offer is the best value for shareholders? All other things being equal,
should a board be prepared to accept a lower bid to ensure a better capitalized
acquiror (at least at the time when the acquisition is effected)? In a broader con-
text, how would one advise a board of directors that decides to relocate opera-
96. Sears Holdings Corp. v. Ontario Securities Commission, [20061 84 O.R. (3d) 61 at para. 13
(Sup. Ct. J.).
97. See e.g. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d. 701 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1983). Defendants are
required to demonstrate the "entire fairness" of an impugned transaction to the corporation.
98. Insider Bids, Issuer Bids, Business Combinations and Related Party Transactions, O.S.C. Rule
61-501.
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tions offshore with a view to ensuring the corporation's long-term commercial
viability, given the conflicting effects on creditor, employee, shareholder, and
other constituencies? Traditional notions of fiduciary duties, oppression, and
the business judgment rule have been confused in the Court's casual discourse
on corporate citizenship and directorial accountability, which is remarkable
both for its lack of analytical rigour and for its necessity to reach the Court's
ultimate decision.
Ironically, the oppression claim-in respect of which relief only extends to
conduct that is prejudicial to the interests of security holders, creditors, directors,
or officers-was abandoned by the bondholders and not argued by their coun-
sel before the Supreme Court. This renders the effect of the Court's discussion
of these issues even more uncertain.
III. ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP
While not an excuse for-casual reasoning by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Peoples and BCE, the debate about imposing corporate citizenship or social re-
sponsibility obligations through corporate law is long-standing. It is fair to say
that courts and legislators have, overall, tended to follow and respond to height-
ened societal expectations over time. The following section of this article con-
siders ways in which this process might be accelerated and clarified.
No one disputes the proposition that corporations may only pursue their
economic mission through lawful means.99 However, legal and political debates
about the role of the corporation in society extend back close to a century, as
discussed further below. The political debate has intensified with the success of
the corporation as a vehicle for mobilizing capital and with its increasing social
impact. As noted by US President Obama in his inaugural address:
Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power
to generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us
that without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control-that a nation cannot
prosper long when it favours only the prosperous.
100
99. Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1986) at 18 (a corporation's
purpose is to "maximize the value of the company's shares, subject to the constraint that the
corporation must meet all its legal obligations to others who are related to or affected by it").
100. Barack Obama, "Inaugural Address" (Delivered at the US Capitol Building, Washington,
20 January 2009), online: <http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2009/January/
20090120130302abretnuhO.2991602.html>.
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Debates on improving the market's "watchful eye" tend to run aground when
they are disconnected from effective legal frameworks. Robert Reich character-
izes these phenomena as a kind of "faux democracy," suggesting that the mes-
sage that companies have social responsibilities tends to divert public attention
from the task of establishing such laws and rules in the first place.1"1 This, in turn,
feeds into the legal debate over corporate social responsibility, which is gener-
ally characterized by competing theories as to the duties of directors and man-
agers to owners or to a wider range of stakeholders. While, as discussed below,
there have been occasional law reform initiatives to address this issue, the debate
has been highly theoretical and repetitive.
Advocates of corporate social responsibility have embraced Peoples as recog-
nizing "as an accurate statement of law" the legal proposition that it may be
legitimate for "directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, em-
ployees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments, and the environment"
in determining whether they are acting with a view to the "best interests of the
corporation.""1 2 There was little Canadian law on this issue prior to Peoples.
10 3
Rather than providing clarification, BCE simply reaffirmed Peoples:
The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual concept.
It is not confined to short-term profit or share value.
In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look to
the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments
and the environment to inform their decisions. Courts should give appropriate def-
erence to the business judgment of directors who take into account these ancillary
interests, as reflected by the business judgment rule.
104
As discussed, such statements add little to the law other than to conflate con-
cepts and provide cover for directorial discretion, assuming appropriate process
is adhered to. The resulting uncertainty concerning proper corporate purpose
could lead to a diminution in directorial accountability and potential liability.
There are a range of alternate legal theories that courts may choose to focus on
101. Robert B. Reich, "The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility" (Goldman School of
Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper No. GSPP08-003, 2008),
online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1213129>.
102. BCE, supra note 7 at para. 39.
103. See Teck Corp., supra note 42 and accompanying text.
104. BCE, supra note 7 at paras. 38, 40.
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to elaborate more meaningfully on the social- or stakeholder-related duties of
directors. Some are canvassed below. In addition, we briefly note several oppor-
tunities for legislative or shareholder-initiated reform.
A. TRUST LAW
The Court's language, particularly in BCE, is somewhat suggestive of theories
of corporate responsibility advanced by A.A. Berle and E. Merrick Dodd in the
nascent stage of the corporate responsibility and accountability debates. In 1931,
Berle advanced the notion that corporate directors would become subject to the
implied oversight of a court's equitable jurisdiction and that, in the future, cor-
porate law would become "in substance, a branch of the law of trust." 105 He
argued that directors' powers are subject to equitable limitations to ensure that
their grant of power is used "for the rateable benefit of all the shareholders as
their interest appears. ' Berle was reacting to the broad powers that directors
exercised on behalf of owners. In effect, he engaged in the same sort of aspira-
tional logic as the Supreme Court, concluding:
In every case, corporate action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules hav-
ing to do with the existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable
rules somewhat analogous to those which apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the
trustee's exercise of wide powers granted to him in the instrument making him a
fiduciary.
107
The Court might have embraced and expanded on Berle's proposal to in-
corporate trust law principles into corporate law.
Berle's argument was taken to its logical conclusion by Dodd the following
year.1"8 Dodd treated the corporation as a separate legal person and characterized
directors as trustees, not for the shareholders but for the separate legal entity.
He then argued that directors could "employ [corporate] funds in a manner
appropriate to a person ... with a sense of social responsibility without thereby
being guilty of a breach of trust."'10 9 Put otherwise, Dodd suggested that any
105. A.A. Berle, Jr., "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust" (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 at 1074.
106. Ibid. at 1049.
107. Ibid
108. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., "For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?" (1932) 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 1145.
109. Ibid. at 1161.
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notion of social responsibility by directors, on behalf of corporations, is volun-
tary but permissible.
Berle quickly responded,1 arguing that Dodd's proposal effectively replaced
the notion of shareholder primacy with nothing but the discretion of manage-
ment, doing away with any legal accountability mechanisms. He characterized
this as simply handing power over to management "with a pious wish that some-
thing nice will come out of it."11 He went on to note that:
[Lawyers] must meet a series of practical situations from day to day. They are not
... in a position to relinquish one position-here, the idea of corporate trusteeship
for security holdings-leaving the situation in flux until a new order shall emerge.
Legal technique does not contemplate intervening periods of chaos; it can only
follow out new theories as they become established and accepted by the community
at large.
112
However, as Berle became more concerned about corporate power, he be-
came more enamoured with the stakeholder theory of corporate governance, as
evidenced by his directive to lawyers to "provide for the new interests as they
successively appear." 113 In his best known work, he suggested "that the 'control'
of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy,
balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning
to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than
private cupidity."
14
Dodd continued to provide the counterpoint as his thinking evolved. In
reviewing The Modern Corporation and Private Property, he seized on the hazard
Berle had initially focused on in their exchange: that duties to the corporation
weakened duties to shareholders without putting anything effective in their place.
He argued that "[iif corporations generally are to be conducted in such manner
as to give due regard to the interests of all classes in society ... it is primarily
through legislation that the change can be brought about."
1 15
110. A.A. Berle, Jr., "For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note" (1932) 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 1366.
111. Ibid. at 1368.
112. Ibid. at 1371.
113. Ibid. at 1372.
114. AdolfA. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New
York: MacMillan, 1932) at 356.
115. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Book Review of The Modern Corporation and Private Property by A.A.
Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means (1933) 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 782 at 785.
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The conclusions of both Berle and Dodd are not as incompatible as they
may at first seem. Berle suggested that the stakeholder debate should be incor-
porated into corporate law through trust law principles. Dodd argued that it
should only be recognized through legislation. In contrast, the Court's analysis
in BCE fails even to suggest a workable framework.
Before leaving the trust law characterization, we should note that courts
have meaningfully wrestled with the extent to which non-shareholder interests
should be considered by directors. For example, several years before the Credit
Lyonnais decision, in Re Central Ice Cream Co.,116 a bankrupt company's only
asset was a $52 million judgment it had obtained against McDonald's. In re-
sponse, McDonald's offered to settle for $16 million, which would have satis-
fied all of the creditor claims and left $4 million for the shareholders. The
creditors favoured the settlement while the shareholders opposed it. Stopping
short of the suggestion in Credit Lyonnais that, in the zone of insolvency, direc-
tors may need to make choices other than those that shareholders would make,
Justice Easterbrook held that bankruptcy law requires the trustee to maximize
the value of the estate. Based on this logic, directors' duties might be analogized
to the trust law principle of "impartiality": the duty of trustees to consider the
trust as a whole, with due regard for the diverse beneficial interests created by
the terms of the trust.
1 17
As with Berle and Dodd, Judge Easterbrook's thinking evolved. Viewing
the corporation as a "nexus of contracts" between various stakeholders relegates
corporate law to a set of default rules 118 that are designed to reduce transac-
tion costs by obviating the need for individual contracts. Such a construct con-
siderably diminishes, if not eliminates, the notion of the corporation as a dis-
tinct entity. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that if the corporation is simply a web
of contracts, it becomes "a financing device and is not otherwise distinctive." '119
The limits of this conceptualization were highlighted in the bid by Rupert
Murdoch's News Corporation for Dow Jones, Inc. About 64 per cent of Dow
116. Re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987).
117. Where the interests of beneficiaries conflict, the trust should try to maximize the value of the
trust as a whole and to "act impartially and with due regard for the diverse beneficial interests
created by the terms of the trust." Restatement of the Law: Trusts, 3d ed. (St. Paul, MN:
American Law Institute Publishers, 2003), § 79(1)(a).
118. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11 at 75.
119. Ibid. at 10.
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Jones was held in various trusts for descendants of the Bancroft family. Some
family members preferred the premium cash offer, while others were prepared
to sacrifice monetary value to ensure continued journalistic integrity. According
to press reports, in considering the various interests involved, the first several
months of negotiations were spent arguing over principles, resulting in various
commitments to protect and invest in the quality of the Dow Jones publications
and news services, while the last several days were spent negotiating price. The
final sweetener was News Corporation and Dow Jones agreeing to pay the
family's advisors' fees, estimated at US$40 million (equal to an additional
US$2 per share for family members on top of the US$60 per share final bid
price).12° Faced with a conflict between money and idiosyncratic preferences,
the outcome was not surprising (and the law was not particularly relevant). To
the extent that fiduciary duties serve as a proscription on self-interest, they tend
to be obscured by the contractual approach to corporate law.
A contrasting contractual analogy to trustee powers in a corporate law con-
text was illustrated in the merger of Reuters PLC and the Thomson Corpora-
tion. As a part of a business combination that gave the controlling shareholder
of the Thomson Corporation control over the combined entity, Thomson and
its controlling shareholder undertook to support the Reuters Trust Principles in
relation to the combined entity. These principles include the preservation of
integrity, the reliability of news, and the development of the news business,
and they are enforced by the Reuters Founders Share Company Limited. In the
merger, this company was to hold a special "founders share" in each of the dual
listed entities, Thomson Reuters Corporation and Thomson Reuters PLC, ena-
bling it to exercise an overriding vote where a third party had obtained prescribed
holdings of voting shares in excess of specified limits.
Kelli Alces has recently argued that efforts to define and enforce corporate
fiduciary duties, where the relationship is not a fiduciary one, has led to the
atrophy of such duties to the point of obsolescence. 2 1 Instead, she recommends
contractually-based disciplinary regimes, including provision for an "equity trus-
tee," which might serve a similar function for shareholders as does an indenture
120. Andrew Ross Sorkin, "Murdoch and Dow Jones: How The Deal Got Done" The New York
Times (1 August 2007), online: <http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/01/murdoch-
and-dow-jones-how-the-deal-got-done>.
121. Kelli A. Alces, "Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth" (2009) 35 J. Corp. L.
[forthcoming], online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1352595>.
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trustee for bondholders. Perhaps there is some basis in such mechanisms for
enshrining the "long-term" focus averted to by the Court in BCE, should a board
and/or a corporation's shareholders so choose. The notion of enshrining over-
riding principles into the corporation's constituting documents merits more
careful review, and is discussed below.
B. TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout significantly advance Dodd's trustee analogy in
proposing the "team production" approach to corporate law as the basis for
describing the existing legal duties of directors (rather than arguing, as have Dodd
and Berle at various stages in their thinking, about what the board's responsi-
bilities should be in the future). 22 They argue that the board's economic and
legal role is to balance competing interests of certain (but not all) stakeholders,
which are essential to team production and the success of the enterprise. Blair
and Stout argue that, like shareholders, these stakeholders make firm-specific
investments, allowing them to extract economic value (including residual enti-
tlements) from the corporation. In describing that role as a "mediating hierarch"
between competing constituencies within the corporation, Blair and Stout see
stakeholders as voluntarily ceding control to the board, which, in promoting
a team enterprise, is then obliged to and responsible for balancing competing
interests.
123
One can read much of this reasoning into BCE. The Supreme Court of Can-
ada stated that the duty of directors to act in the best interests of the corporation:
[C]omprehends a duty to treat individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions
equitably and fairly. There are no absolute rules. In each case, the question is whether,
in all the circumstances, the directors acted in' the best interests of the corporation,
having regard to all relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the need
to treat affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate with the corporation's
duties as a responsible corporate citizen.
12
4
Until recently, such notions rarely caused legal confusion. Indeed, ambiguity
in statutory duties allowed for constructive tension and responsive judicial
interpretation in egregious cases. Any dissonance between the legal duties of
122. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, "A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law" (1999)
85 Va. L. Rev. 247.
123. Ibid.
124. BCE, supra note 7 at para. 82.
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directors to owners and their broader obligations has tended to be that of theory
and behaviour. In practice, the day-to-day conduct of effective managers gener-
ally reflects an implicit view of corporate obligations to a variety of constituents
as being more immediate, if not more important, to the enterprise than its obli-
gations to shareholders. Convergence is achieved, as the Court implied, by taking
a longer-term view of value and wealth maximization.
The difficulty has arisen in the face of systemic behaviour that challenges the
incumbency of management and rewards the immediate realization of share-
holder value, often to the detriment of other constituents. As is generally the
case, market forces (including the short-term focus of incentive structures, the
opportunity for deception arising from financial innovation, the limited attention
span of politicians, and the overwhelming urge to manage public expectations)
trumped legal theory. At such a juncture, a legal construct which professes to
balance multiple interests breaks down insofar as it provides neither coherence,
consistency, nor organizational focus.
Those who advocate team production (or other-than-shareholder primacy)
recognize this limitation. For example, Richard Ellsworth argues in favour of
customer primacy as providing the most effective discipline on corporate man-
agement. 2 ' Blair and Stout do not address this challenge of keeping account-
ability focused; nor did the Court. While reaffirming die stakeholder model
of directors' duties that it had endorsed in Peoples (and, hence, largely accept-
ing the bondholders' argument as to directors' duties) the Court ruled against
the bondholders in BCE, concluding that they had no reasonable expectation to
anything more than the contractual rights provided to them in the trust inden-
tures pursuant to which their bonds were issued.
Examples of new stakeholder-based governance models (in addition to more
traditional models, such as cooperatives and employee-owned firms) are rapidly
emerging. A recent survey of such experiments in substituting social benefit for
profit maximization as the dominant organizational principle around which
ownership, governance, capitalization, and compensation structures are de-
signed identified three dominant models. 2 ' The first is the stakeholder-owned
company, such as the Rabobank Group in the Netherlands, the Vanguard group
125. Richard R. Ellsworth, Leading with Purpose: The New Corporate Realities (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2002). This would have been an ironic test to apply to BCE, which, until
relatively recently, enjoyed monopoly status in Canada.
126. Marjorie Kelly, "Not Just for Profit" Strategy &Business 2009:54 (24 February 2009) 49.
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of mutual funds, or John Lewis Partnership PLC. The latter is the largest de-
partment store chain in the United Kingdom, currently wholly-owned by some
69,000 employees. It is overseen by a traditional board as well as by an employee-
elected governing body (which, in turn, elects five of the twelve board members
and has the power to dismiss the chairman). The second is the mission-controlled
company, such as Thomson Reuters PLC and Upstream 21 Corporation. Up-
stream 21 is a holding company established in Oregon to buy local companies
that are focused on building social and economic capital within the region and
facilitated by recent reforms to Oregon's corporate law, which are described be-
low. Finally, there is the public-private hybrid, which deliberately blurs the lines
between for-profit and non-profit modes of operation. Google.org, which man-
ages Google's annual philanthropic budget of about US$2 billion,127 terms itself
"for-profit philanthropy," and operates as a division of Google, eschewing the
traditional, tax-exempt, foundation organizational structure in order to embed
itself within, and fully draw upon, Google's resources.
C. MORAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY
The team production approach to corporate law fails to address the issue of
immediate accountability. Most directors are anxious to meet all prescribed legal
norms and are reluctant to stray much further. The proliferation of new gov-
ernance standards (and consequential liability) has exacerbated their proclivity
to risk-averse behaviour.
It has been argued that moral stakeholder theory (MST) may "hold the key
to giving the board a more useful, comprehensive framework of the firm's utility
and purpose to society,"' 28 MST can be summarized as upholding the beliefs
that "fiduciary obligations go beyond short-term profit and are in any case sub-
ject to moral criteria in their execution; and ... mere compliance with the law
can be unduly limited and even unjust."' 29 Like the team production approach,
127. See Dana B. Reiser, "For-Profit Philanthropy" (2008), online: The Berkley Electronic Press
<http://works.bepress.com/dana brakmanreiser/14> [unpublished]. In Google's initial
public offering (IPO), discussed later in this article, the company announced its intention to
contribute 1 per cent of equity and 1 per cent of profits to charity.
128. Rookmin Maharaj, "Critiquing and Contrasting 'Moral' Stakeholder Theory and 'Strategic'
Stakeholder: Implications for the Board of Directors" (2008) 8 Corp. Gov. 2 at 115 (Abstract).
129. Kenneth E. Goodpaster, "Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis" (1991) 1 Bus. Ethics Q.
53 at 70.
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MST implies that a board's role is to balance the competing interests of various
stakeholders. While the team production approach fails to provide a workable
framework for stakeholder identification and how their interests should be bal-
anced, MST, through the identification of relational attributes, seeks to provide
insight on that point. For example, Mitchell, Agle, and Wood narrow the defi-
nition of stakeholder on the basis of "power to influence the firm, legitimacy of
the stakeholder relationship with the firm, and the urgency of the stakeholder
claim on the firm."1 30 Using such criteria to map stakeholders might better enable
directors to recognize, prioritize, and thereby manage various stakeholder inter-
ests more efficiently and move away from market-induced, short-term incentives.
In response to Milton Friedman's concern that "few trends could so thor-
oughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by
corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money
for their stockholders as possible,"1 31 MST mapping arguably benefits corpora-
tions financially, even though directors may not have anticipated financial gain
at the time of stakeholder identification. For example, in an interview regarding
an energy company that suffered financial loss and long-term costs because of its
inability to identify and prioritize stakeholders' interests, a company executive
stated, "I think that the stakeholder risks that developed ... were not ones that
....... hIA e . n ....  tr, Prhaps. . because of our l-c, of nowedean d nder
standing about a bunch of church groups."
132
It is often the case that stakeholders will have unique insights to contribute
to the success of an enterprise. For that reason-and a desire to promote effec-
tive stakeholder engagement-corporate reporting is increasingly viewed as a
process through which stakeholders can be meaningfully engaged. It is viewed
as more than simply an outcome required by regulation. Put otherwise, the iden-
tification of stakeholder interests, according to MST, may provide more focused
accountability.
A similar mapping exercise might be beneficial at a societal (i.e., national
or regional) level. While the "virtues" of responsibility, accountability, fairness,
130. Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle & Donna J. Wood, "Toward a Theory of Stakeholder
Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts" (1997)
22 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 853 at 854.
131. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) at
133-34.
132. Maharaj, supra note 128 at 119.
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and transparency are widely accepted and implicit in most corporate governance
frameworks,13 their application is highly contextual. There is debate as to how
far and to whom such virtues should be applied. Andrew West recently pro-
posed a research agenda to address the question of whether corporate governance
convergence between various jurisdictions is appropriate. 134 He noted that, irre-
spective of the answer to the question he posed, such an inquiry might inform
governance frameworks, including accounting practice, managerial approaches,
and business education.
1 35
D. OBLIGATION TO ACT REASONABLY
We have previously noted how, in an early effort to defer to the business judg-
ment of directors, courts exempted directors from general tort law principles,
increasing the threshold for liability under statutory duties of care and loyalty to
one of gross negligence. Canadian jurisprudence was further muddled following
the Federal Court of Canada's decision in Mentmore Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.
National Merchandise Manufacturing Co.,136 where Justice LeDain asserted a
conflict between the principles of tort law and corporate law. 137 Leaving aside
confusion regarding the argument that directors should be subject to the same
application of tort law as others are, 138 there is a broader argument that, in all
basic areas of law governing market conduct (including tort, contract, and prop-
erty law), there is a fundamental duty to act reasonably.
Joseph Singer characterizes this as an "obligation of attentiveness, "139 arguing
that directors, in their oversight of corporate conduct, are subject to the same
133. See e.g. Ira M. Millstein et. al, Corporate Governance: Improving Competitiveness andAccess to
Capital in Global Markets: Report to the OECD by the Business Sector Advisory Group on
Corporate Governance (Paris: OECD Publications, 1998).
134. Andrew West, "Corporate Governance Convergence and Moral Relativism" (2009) 17 Corp.
Gov.: Int'l Rev. 107.
135. Ibid. at 117.
136. (1978), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 195 (F.C.A.).
137. See Robert Flannigan, "The Personal Tort Liability of Directors" (2002) 81 Can. Bar Rev. 247.
138. There are currently operating in Canada a number of arguably inconsistent judicial
approaches to the question of when directors may be found liable to third parties for tortious
corporate acts. See e.g. Nicolas Juzda, The Tort Liability of Directors to Parties Outside the
Corporation (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2007) [unpublished].
139. Joseph William Singer, "Corporate Responsibility in a Free and Democratic Society" (2008)
58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1.
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equitable obligations as others to attend to the effects of their actions on others.
These obligations apply to those with whom the corporation has continuing
relationships (i.e., stakeholders) as well as to the interests of strangers. Beyond
specific laws that create clear limits on corporate conduct, Singer suggests that
this obligation to attend to the interests of others is based in the common law
duty to act reasonably: "We are not free to cause significant harm to others....
We have an obligation to balance their interests against our own to determine
whether we can justify the harm we may cause them.""'
The environmental law precautionary principle may also serve to elaborate
on directors' duty of care. The principle, mandating precautionary measures in
the face of threats of serious or irreversible environmental harm, has now been
widely embraced in international law, as well as domestic Canadian and US stat-
utes and jurisprudence.' A similar concept has been advanced by John Ruggie
in his efforts to operationalize a "protect, respect, and remedy" framework re-
garding the issue of human rights and transnational corporations. 1 2 He argues
for a "corporate responsibility to respect human rights" or, put simply, "not to
infringe on the rights of others."'14 3 Likewise, trust scholars have suggested that
financial fiduciaries might be subjected to a statutory duty to consult with their
beneficiaries when formulating investment policies. 144 The concept of a "duty to
consult and accommodate" has been developed extensively by the Court in the
context of the Crown's obligations to Aboriginal peoples. It has held that such a
duty arises when the Crown contemplates conduct that might adversely affect
Aboriginal rights or title.4 '
140. Ibid. at 6.
141. For a full discussion of the development and extended relevance of the precautionary
principles, see Michael Kerr, Richard Janda & Chip Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility: A
LegalAnalysis (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2009).
142. John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights:
Towards Operationalizing the "Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework, UNHRCOR, 1 th
Sess., UN Doc. A/HRC/I 1/13 (1999).
143. Ibid. at paras. 23, 24. See also paras. 45-55.
144. Gary Watt, Trusts and Equity, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 437.
This proposal raises interesting issues as to how the views of contingent beneficiaries are to
be taken into account.
145. See Kent McNeil, "The Crown's Fiduciary Obligations in the Era of Aboriginal Self-
Government" Can. Bar Rev. [forthcoming]; Sonia Lawrence & Patrick Macklem, "From
Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and the Crown's Duty to Consult" (2000)
79 Can. Bar Rev. 252.
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Given this judicial history, it would not have been a significant leap for the
Court in BCE to develop an explicit directorial "duty to consider," as has been
suggested by Judd Sneirson. 14 Under such a theory, fulfilling the statutory
duty of care would require directors to consider all reasonably available material
information. A broad view of materiality would include the consideration of
potential impacts on various stakeholders. Failure to do so could lead to decisions
being invalidated by the courts. 14 7 Such a notion comports with the Court's
reasoning that, once stakeholder interests have been considered, directors can
reach whatever decision they believe is in the best interests of the corporation.
It would also be consistent with management literature, which suggests that a
broader stakeholder assessment framework will lead to better corporate decision-
making.
14 8
Here, again, the challenge is one of accountability. While the duty of loyalty
can be utilized to limit the pursuit of self-interest by individual directors or man-
agers, there is no equivalent construct for the corporation itself. Without the
elaboration of clear standards by the courts or legislators, it is unrealistic to hold
directors accountable to the level of moral reasoning that is implicit in a "duty
of attentiveness" for the "reasonableness" of corporate actions.
E. ENHANCED DUTIES
Another approach to director duties and accountability would be to articulate
"enhanced duties" analogous to, but broader than, the Revlon duty in US juris-
prudence. In BCE the Court purported to reject such a duty (but, as a practical
matter, appeared to embrace it). For example, Bernard Sharfman recently pro-
posed a standard of conduct for public company boards when dealing with,
excessively risky decisions. In such circumstances, he would require that boards
specifically consider the company's liquidity, capital adequacy, and funding risk,
et cetera, before determining whether it is in the best interests of the corporation
to proceed with such a decision.
14 9
146. Judd F. Sneirson, "Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care for Better, More
Socially Responsible Decision-Making" (2007) 3 Corp. Gov. L. Rev. 438.
147. However, absent gross negligence, directors would generally remain effectively immune from
personal liability as a result of indemnification provisions.
148. Michael C. Jensen, "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function" (2001) 14 J. App. Corp. Fin. 8.
149. Bernard S. Sharfman, "Enhancing the Efficiency of Board Decision Making: Lessons
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Sharfman's standard of conduct would interact with the existing standard of
review and be consistent with the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision in
Lyondell as well as the approach to board oversight taken by then-Chancellor
Allen in Caremark.' Caremark identified a new affirmative duty to monitor
corporate compliance with "applicable legal standards," whether or not the board
had been given any notice of the wrongdoing on the part of the company's
employees. It should be noted that Allen has recently expressed reservations
about the effect of directorial liability on risk-taking in the absence of a conflict
of interest.151 He describes how shareholders seek to shift risk to directors when-
ever things go wrong, thereby discouraging subsequent risk-taking. Providing
guidance (rather than prescribing punishment) might best serve to clarify the
manner in which directors fulfill their duties of care and loyalty in the context
of specified decisions. The Delaware Supreme Court noted in Stone v. Ritter
that "[w]here directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby
demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their
duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith."' 52
While this judicial observation was made in the context of a board accused of
not having a system in place to monitor violations of law, it might be applied to
an articulation of other fact situations.
If anything has been learned from the most current financial crisis, it relates
to the interconnectedness that characterizes global policy making and enter-
prise.'53 Leaders in the private and public sphere now realize (although they
may still resist) the need to extend their horizons temporally, sectorally, and
geographically. With the growing recognition that social issues have profound
Learned from the Financial Crisis of 2008" (2009) 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 813.
150. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (2009) (holding that board liability may be
found only if the board utterly failed to perform its duties); Re Caremark International Inc.
Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del Ch. 1996).
151. Supra note 67.
152. 911 A.2d 362 at 370 (Del S.C. 2006).
153. See e.g. John M. Broder, "Climate Change Seen as Threat to U.S. Security" The New
York Times (9 August 2009), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/science/
earth/09climate.html>. In commenting on the geo-political impacts of climate change,
General Anthony Zinni, former head of the US Central Command, is quoted, "We
will pay to reduce greenhouse emissions today, and we'll have to take an economic hit of
some kind. Or we will pay the price later in military terms and that will involve human
lives."
WALTZER & JASWAL, THE GOOD CORPORATE "CITIZEN" 477
effects on long-term business prospects, notions of corporate citizenship become
more consonant with traditional fiduciary norms.
154
F. STATUTORY REFORM
Prescribing standards for corporate responsibility may not lend itself to the nar-
rowness (and shallowness) that characterizes the evolution of common law in
small, incremental steps. It behooves us also to canvass legislative initiatives to
develop and clarify such norms. Recent efforts have tended to focus on more
expansive conceptions of directors' duties and on reporting standards aimed at
encouraging more responsible corporate conduct.
1. DIRECTORS' DUTIES REDEFINED
As noted above, the ambiguity inherent in statutory directorial duties began to
break down in the 1980s, when hostile, leveraged control transactions challenged
the incumbency of managers and rewarded the immediate realization of share-
holder value, often to the detriment of other constituents. The ensuing "corpo-
rate constituency statutes," adopted by many US states from the 1980s onwards,
empower (but generally do not require) directors to consider a wide range of
interests in their decision-making, including those of employees, customers,
creditors, and local communities.155 While such statutes have proven challenging
for practitioners advising boards (because, like the decision in BCE, they are so
open-ended), most are permissive and do not expose directors to liability if they
choose to disregard non-shareholder interests." 6 So, too, with the Delaware case
154. Benjamin J. Richardson, "Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical
Investment" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 243 at 271. For analogous arguments concerning
the fiduciary obligations of institutional investors, see Asset Management Working Group,
United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative, Fiduciary Responsibility: Legal
and Practical Aspects of Integrating Environmental, Social and Governance Issues Into Institutional
Investment: A Follow Up to the AMWG's "Freshfields Report, UNEP Fl, 2009, UNEP Job No.
DTI/1204/GE, online: <http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/fiduciaryI.pdfs.
155. See e.g. Eric W. Orts, "Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes"
(1992) 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 14.
156. An exception is the constituency statute of Connecticut, which only applies in respect of control
transactions and requires (rather than permits) directors to consider stakeholder interests in
determining the best interests of the corporation. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-313(e)
(West 1992). The Indiana and Pennsylvania statutes state that directors need not focus solely
on the interest of shareholders as determinative, but may consider other stakeholder interests.
See Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-35-1(0 (West 2009); Pa. Star. Ann. tit. 15, § 1715 (West 2009).
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law permitting directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituents
in the context of hostile takeovers." 7 In this respect, they differ from the argu-
ments of Blair and Stout (and possibly the theory of BCE), which suggest that a
board must, or at leasi should, take such non-shareholder interests into account.
The impetus for such legislative reform was takeover protection, based on
the popular sentiment of ensuring that local (i.e., state) interests would not be
adversely affected as a consequence of such transactions (and the cost-cutting
and asset-disposals which often follow). The conflict between these objectives
and shareholder wealth maximization, as well as the obvious conflict of interest
in incumbent directors using such statutory provisions to secure their own posi-
tions, may be the reason why the "corporate citizenship" goals that are suggested
in these statutes have not been realized.1"8 It should be noted that most such
statutes are not limited in their application to control transactions.159
This conflict was belied in the 1990s, as compensation schemes responded
to, and exacerbated, the increasingly short-term focus of market participants.
The transformation was profound and overwhelming. For example, the US
Business Roundtable-which had stressed the social role that corporations play
in their communities with the advent of hostile takeovers-revised its position
in 1997 to refocus on the paramount duty of management to shareholders.
160
Corporate executives who had portrayed raiders as vandals now embraced the
very same values-a process of reinvention which characterizes (and is often
both a strength and Achilles' heel of) our enterprise system. Yet, even without
constituency statutes, broad managerial discretion has been recognized in US
corporate law.
161
157. See Unocal, supra note 66; Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1990).
158. Alternatively, it is widely viewed that these laws simply confirm, in change of control
situations, the broad discretion conferred upon directors under the business judgment rule.
159. Orts, supra note 155.
160. The Business Roundtable, "Statement on Corporate Governance" (September 1997), online:
European Corporate Governance Institute <http://www.ecgi.org/codesldocuments/
businessroundtable.pdf>.
161. See e.g. American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations, vol. 1 (St. Paul, MN.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1994), § 2.01(b).
Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in
the conduct of its business:
(1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law;
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Law reform initiatives in Canada and Australia have, in recent years, con-
sidered and rejected as unnecessary proposals to amend corporate law to permit
or require directors to take into account the interests of non-shareholder con-
stituencies in their actions. In the process leading to the most recent amend-
ments to the CBCA, in 2001, Industry Canada published a discussion paper on
directors' liability. 162 While noting that the term "best interests of the corpora-
tion" is far from clear, and citing a survey of previous case law suggesting that
"where [the] relationship between the short-term and longer-term or broader-
based interests is incapable of precise definition ... Canadian directors have few
guidelines,""16 the paper suggested that "[the] circumstances are not prevalent,
and thus, the absence of guidelines in these cases is not a major issue."'1 4 While
considering various options, particularly in response to control transactions, the
report recommended that no legislative changes be made in this area and that the
courts be left to develop the concept of the "best interest of the corporation.
16 5
In Australia, both the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial Services1 66 and the federal governmental Corporations and Markets
Advisory Committee 167 concluded that Australian corporate law already affords
sufficient basis for directors to consider the interests of stakeholders, including
shareholders. Both rejected the desirability of legislative reform. The latter com-
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate
to the responsible conduct of business; and
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian,
educational, and philanthropic purposes.
162. Industry Canada, "Canada Business Corporations Act: Discussion Paper: Directors'
Liability" (November 1995), online: Depositary Services Program <http:/dsp-psd.pwdgsc.
gc.calCollection/C2-280-7-1995 E.pdf>.
163. Mindy Paskell-Mede & John Nicholl, "Directors' Liability from Private Rights of Action"
(May 25, 1994) [unpublished], cited in ibid. at 15-16.
164. Industry Canada, ibid. at 16.
165. Ibid. at 18.
166. Austl., Commonwealth, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial
Services (PJCCFS), Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value (Canberra:
Senate Printing Unit, Parliament House, 2006), online: Parliament of Australia
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/corporations-cute/completed-inquiries/
2004-07/corporate-responsibility/report/report.pdf>.
167. Austl., Commonwealth, Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC), The
Social Responsibility of Corporations (Sydney: CAMAC, 2006), online: <http://www.camac.
gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFFinal+Reports+2006/$file/CSRReport.pdf>.
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mittee noted that including a non-exhaustive list of interests to be taken into
account, in the absence of guidance as to how such interests are to be prioritized
and reconciled, could "make directors less accountable to shareholders without
significantly enhancing the rights of other parties."168
In contrast, the UK Companies Act 2006 introduced a new statutory duty
of loyalty that requires directors to "promote the success of the company for the
benefit of its members as a whole" and, in doing so, take account of a range of
statutorily prescribed considerations, including:
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company's employees,
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers
and others,
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of
business conduct, and
(0 the need to act fairly as between members of the company.169
There has been little judicial consideration of state constituency statutes.
We are only aware of one instance in which such a statute has been referred to
in finding in favour of a decision by an incumbent board.170 It is not surprising
that courts have shied away from the juridification of stakeholder interests; BCE
illustrates the challenge. The UK statutory standard, while requiring (rather than
permitting) directors to consider stakeholder interests, ultimately adjudges their
deliberations based on whether their decisions "promote the success of the com-
pany for the benefit of its members [i.e., shareholders] as a whole." 71 The most
one can reasonably expect of such a standard is to see judicial validation for long-
term wealth creation, rather than a new locus for directorial accountability. Even
those firmly wedded to shareholder value would concede this point.'
72
168. Ibid. at 112.
169. CompaniesAct2006(U.K.), 2006, c. 46, s. 172(1).
170. Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Great Northern Nakoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Me. 1989),
referred to in Richard Marens & Andrew Wicks, "Getting Real: Stakeholder Theory,
Managerial Practice, and the General Irrelevance of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Shareholders"
(1999) 9 Bus. Ethics Q. 273 at 284.
171. CompaniesAct 2006 (U.K.), supra note 169, s. 172(1).
172. See e.g. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, "The End of History for Corporate Law"
(2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 439. Hansmann and Kraakman state that there is "no longer any
serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-
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In 2007, Oregon amended its Business Corporations Act to expressly permit
an Oregon corporation's Articles of Incorporation to include a provision "author-
izing or directing the corporation to conduct the business of the corporation in a
manner which is environmentally and socially responsible."' 73 While apparently
intended to address "sustainability" concerns, the amending legislation does not
purport to define "environmentally and socially responsible" conduct. Presuma-
bly, those utilizing this provision will take care in doing so, to avoid uncertainty
or conflict with other corporate objectives.
2. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
An expected corollary of the new statutory duty in the UK Companies Act was to
have substantially enhanced social transparency through an annual Operating
and Financial Review (OFR) requirement.' 7' The OFR would be required of all
"major companies" and would require directors to consider including material
relevant to the interests of stakeholders, such as the company's policies relating
to employment, environmental issues, and social and community issues relevant
to the company's business. 7 ' However, as the bill went through parliamentary
debates, the OFR requirement was withdrawn, leaving only the requirement to
include in a public company's Annual Business Review "information about en-
vironmental matters ... , the company's employees, and social and community
matters."'' According to the statute, the purpose of the business review is "to
inform members of the company and help them assess how the directors have
performed their duty under s. 172. "177 Information about environmental, em-
ployee, and community matters is not required if, in the view of the directors, it
does not assist in understanding the business of the company. Nor must directors
state why such disclosure is not provided. The deletion of the OFR requirement
term shareholder value" (at 439). See also Michael Jensen, "Value Maximization,
Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Objective Function" (2001) 7 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 297
at 309.
173. Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.0 47(2)(e) (2007). See also Perkins Coie, News, "Recent Oregon Legislation
Addresses Corporate Social Responsibility" (8 January 2008), online: <http://www.perkinscoie.
com/news/pubs-detail.aspx?publication= 1 553&op=updates>.
174. U.K., Department of Trade and Industry, Modernising Company Law (Government White
Paper, Cm 5553-1) (London: The Stationery Office, 2002).
175. Ibid. at 149, cls. 77, 78.
176. CompaniesAct2006 (U.K.), supra note 169, s. 417(5).
177. Ibid., s. 417(2).
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in the UK Companies Act was a disappointment to those who view social trans-
parency as a way to influence norms of corporate conduct. 7
There remains, however, ample ground for optimism, both as to the impo-
sition of new social transparency requirements and their effect on corporate con-
duct. For example, the European Parliament's recent resolution on corporate
social responsibility anticipates more expansive social transparency, "so that
social and environmental reporting" are included alongside financial reporting
requirements. 79 This observation was made having regard to the shortcomings
of voluntary social reporting in which "only a minority [of the reports] use inter-
nationally accepted standards and principles, cover the company's full supply
chain or involve independent monitoring and verification.,
180
In South Africa, the King Report (a voluntary governance code that was first
published in 1994, revised in 2002, and revised again in 2009) advocates an inte-
grated approach that takes into account the "triple bottom line": people, profits,
and planet. 8' The King Report recommends that companies move away from
profit maximization, and, in developing business strategies, focus on a broad
range of stakeholders." 2 It recommends disclosure of the nature and extent of a
company's commitment to social, ethical, safety, health, and environmental
practices, as well as organizational integrity. While compliance is voluntary,
most South African public companies follow the King Report's recommenda-
tions as a result of initiatives by various external sources to track and publish
performance. For example, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange launched a So-
cially Responsible Investment (SRI) market index in May 2004, based on pro-
prietary criteria, in keeping with the framework promoted by the UN Principles
for Responsible Investment.183 Major South African companies, including SAB
178. See e.g. Cynthia A. Williams, "The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency" (1999) 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197; Cynthia A. Williams & John M.
Conley, "An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value
Construct" (2005) 38 Cornell Int'l L.J. 493.
179. EC, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Report on Corporate Social Responsibility:
A New Partnership (Luxembourg: EC, 2006) at 10.
180. Ibid. at 9-10.
181. Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IOD), King Report on Governance for South Africa
(Cape Town: IOD, 2009), online: <http://african.ipapercms.dk/IOD/KINGIII/kingiiireport>.
182. Ibid.
183. Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) Secretariat, Principles for Responsible Investment,
online: <http://www.unpri.org/>; Johannesburg Stock Exchange USE), Social Responsibility
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Miller, AngloGold Ashanti, and Mondi actively report social responsibility ini-
tiatives on their websites. The King Report was also referred to by a South Afri-
can court in finding that directors had breached environmental orders. The
court specifically noted that the corporate community within South Africa has
widely accepted the recommendations of the King Report, stressing that one of
the characteristics of good corporate governance is social responsibility.
184
The French Code de Commerce (Commercial Code) was amended in 2001 to
require all French corporations listed on its primary stock exchange to report
annually on social and environmental impacts.185 This requirement was elabo-
rated upon the following year by a decree which specifies categories of social,
community-related, and environmental information that must be disclosed. 86
Under the new Social Responsibility for Large Businesses law, which amended
the Danish Financial Statements Act 87 as of 1 January 2009, an estimated 11,000
of the largest Danish companies (whether listed, private, or state-owned) are now
required to include information on their corporate responsibility policies and
practices in their annual financial reports. An absence of such corporate respon-
sibility policies must also be reported. A stated objective of the legislation is to
encourage large businesses "to work actively on ways they can contribute to
solving social challenges." '188 This links to a longer-term governmental strategy,
outlined in the May 2008 government "Action Plan on Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility."'89 The Action Plan stated the government's intention "to promote
social responsibility and help Danish businesses reap more benefits from being
at the global vanguard of corporate social responsibility."'
Investment (SRI) Index, online: <http://www.jse.co.za/sri>.
184. Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v. Stilfontein Gold Mining Co., [2006] ZAGPHC 47 (S.
Mr. H.C. (Wit. Local Div.)).
185. Code de Commerce, Art. L225-102, as amended by Loin2001-420 du 15 mai 2001, J.O., 16
May 2001, 7776.
186. See Lucien J. Dhooge, "Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and France's Nouvelles
Regulations Economiques" (2004) 21 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 441.
187. See The Danish Commerce and Companies Agency, Proposal for an Act Amending the
Danish Financial Statements Act (Report on Social Responsibility for Large Businesses), online:
<http://www.eogs.dklgraphics/Samfundsansvar.dk/Dokumenter/Proposal-Report.-OnSocial_
Resp.pdf>.
188. Ibid. at 4.
189. Denmark, Action Plan on Corporate Social Responsibility (2008), online: <http://www.eogs.dk/
graphics/Samfundsansvar.dk/Dokumenter/Action planCSR.pdf>.
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In 2008, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) adopted a new set of corpo-
rate governance principles that frame corporate citizenship issues within the no-
tion of "material business risks." Such risks are defined as follows:
Material business risks have the potential to create value and protect established value.
The following examples of material business risk categories are identified in Principle
7: operational, environmental, sustainability, compliance, strategic, ethical conduct,
reputation or brand, technological, product or service quality, human capital, financial
reporting, [and] market-related risks. 19a
Listed companies must establish policies concerning "material business risk
management" and disclose a summary thereof. According to the Corporate
Governance Council, "[w]here a company has risks'relating to sustainability or
corporate social responsibility that are material to its business they should be
considered in the context of [the revised reporting requirement]." '
In 2009, Australian authorities announced support for the establishment of
the Responsible Investment Academy, designed to mount education and training
programs to enable the investment community to better assess "environmental,
social, and governance" (ESG) considerations." 2 A senior Australian Treasury
official has also been appointed to the Global Reporting Initiative Governmental
Advisory Group, with the Minister for Superannuation and Corporate Law not-
ing: "it's clear to me that the true value of corporate responsibility crystallizes
around effective reporting." 193
Another recent example of a similar approach was that proposed by the Ca-
nadian Securities Administrators (CSA) in their request for comments on pro-
190. ASX Corporate Governance Council, "Review of the Principles of Good Corporate Governance
and Best Practice Recommendations" (2 August 2007) at 4, online: Chartered Secretaries
Australia <http://www.csaust.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=ASX_.CorporateGovernance
Councilguidelines&Template -/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=9231 >.
191. ASX Corporate Governance Council, News Release, "Revised Corporate Governance Principles
Released" (25 September 2008), online: CPA Australia <http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/
cps/rde/xchg/SID-3F 57FECA-1 DFF2D2D/cpa/hs.xsl/ 1017_23703_ENAHTML.htm>.
192. Australian Minister for Superannuation & Corporate Law, Media Release No. 009,
"Government to provide assistance for establishment of responsible investment academy"
(2 February 2009), online: Treasury Portfolio Ministers <http://minscl.treasurer.gov.au/
DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=ppressrelease/2009/009.htm&pagelD=&min=njs&Year=&DocType=0>.
193. Australian Minister for Superannuation & Corporate Law, Media Release No. 008,
"Australian representative to join global reporting initiative" (5 February 2009), online:
Treasury Portfolio Ministers <http://minscl.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?
doc=ppressrelease/2009/008.htm&pagelD=&min= njs&Year=&DocType=O>.
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posals to replace their existing corporate governance regulatory regime. 194 The
proposed, but recently abandoned, CSA National Policy 58-201: Corporate
Governance Guidelines, articulated nine core "high-level corporate governance
principles and [would have] provide[d] guidance to issuers on their corporate
governance structures and practices."195 In connection with the draft commentary
to "Principle 5 - Promote Integrity," the CSA provided examples of generally
recommended practices, including adoption of a code of conduct."' The CSA
suggested that, in connection with the adoption of such a code of conduct,
issues to be addressed should include "the issuer's responsibilities to security
holders, employees, those with whom it has a contractual relationship and the
broader community."1
9 7
Increasingly, public companies and their counsel are facing difficult judg-
ment calls as to whether non-financial information concerning a company's en-
vironmental policies or social practices might be viewed as "material" under
relevant securities laws.1 98 For example, over the last several years, a number of
investor groups, lead by CERES,"9 9 have sought to pressure the US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to mandate climate change disclosure in
public filings. CERES, along with the New York Attorney General, a number
of state treasurers, pension fund managers, and others, petitioned the SEC on
194. Canadian Securities Administrators, Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin, "Request for
Comment - Proposed Repeal and Replacement of NP 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines,
NI 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, and NI 52-110 Audit Committees and
Companion Policy 52-11OCP Audit Committees" (2008) 31 OSCB 12158 (19 December
2008) [CSA, "Request for Comment"]. On 13 November 2009, the CSA announced their
determination to not implement the proposals. Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff
Notice 58-305, "Status Report on the Proposed Changes to the Corporate Governance
Regime" (2009) 32 OSCB 9347.
195. CSA, "Request for Comment," ibid., 58-201, App. B, Part I, 1.2.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid. Curiously, CSA National Policy 62-202, Take-Over Bids - Defensive Tactics purports to
remove many of the tools that a self-entrenching board might seek to invoke to favour non-
shareholder constituencies.
198. See e.g. David Monsma & Timothy Olson, "Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality
and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-
financial Information" (2007) 26 Stan. Envtl L.J. 137.
199. CERES (Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies) is a coalition of investors
and public interest groups focused on improving corporate, environmental, and social
performance. See online: <http://www.ceres.org>.
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18 September 2007 to provide interpretive guidance on climate risk disclo-
sure.2 1' A supplemental filing on 12 June 2008 described subsequent develop-
ments from the date of the original petition." 1 The request was reiterated in a




As of January 2010, the SEC has not officially responded to these submis-
sions. However, the New York Attorney General (who was a signatory to the
original CERES petition) issued subpoenas to five energy companies on 14
September 2007, questioning the adequacy of their climate change disclosure
under New York securities law. 2 3 The subpoenas and subsequent investigations
resulted in settlements with two of the companies, Xcel and Dynegy, in August
and October 2008, respectively. Each company agreed to provide more detailed
climate disclosure in their future SEC annual reports, including descriptions on
present financial risks and probable regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, liti-
gation, physical impact associated with climate change, and strategies to reduce
climate change risks.20 4
Pressure on the SEC continues. 25 Most recently, the SEC's Investor Advi-
sory Committee has indicated its intention to establish a subcommittee to focus
on disclosure of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors.2 6
200. Petition to the US Securities and Exchange Commission for Interpretive Guidance on Climate
Risk Disclosure (18 September 2007), online: <http:lwww.incr.com//Document.Doc?id= 187>.
201. Letter from California Public Employees' Retirement System et al. to Nancy M. Morris, US
Securities and Exchange Commission Secretary (12 June 2008).
202. Letter from California Public Employees' Retirement System et a. to Florence E. Harmon,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Acting Secretary (22 October 2008) (calling on
the SEC to consider how material environmental, social, and corporate governance data can
be integrated into public filings).
203. Martin Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352-c, 353 (allowing investigation of any "fraudulent
practice" related to investments).
204. See Re Xcel Energ Inc.: Assurance ofDiscontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15), AOD #08-
012 (N.Y. Att'y Gen., Envtl. Prot. Bureau 2008); Re Dynegy Inc.: Assurance of Discontinuance
Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15), AOD #08-132 (N.Y. Att'y Gen., Envd. Prot. Bureau 2008).
205. See e.g. Letter from Lisa Woll, CEO of Social Investment Forum, to Honorable Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman of United States Securities and Exchange Commission (21 July 2009),
online: Social Investment Forum <http://www.socialinvest.org/documents/ESG-letter-to_
SEC.pdf> (requesting increased ESG disclosure); Letter from Ceres' Investor Network on
Climate Risk to Honorable Mary L. Schapiro (12 June 2009), online: Investor Network on
Climate Risk <htrtp://www.incr.com/Page.aspx?pid=1107> (requesting improved disclosure
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While the SEC has yet to issue guidance, the Canadian Institute of Char-
tered Accountants did so in late 2008.207 This was followed by an Ontario Securi-
ties Commission (OSC) Staff Notice on environmental reporting which, based
on a review of the continuous disclosure documents of thirty-five issuers, found
a number of common deficiencies and issued guidance in respect thereof. The
Staff Notice explicitly considers the materiality of environmental matters both
from a financial statement and continuous disclosure perspective. 20 8 This ap-
proach may signal a convergence of legal and aspirational requirements, focusing
on the "materiality" of non-financial information. Further, on 9 April 2009 the
Ontario Legislature voted unanimously to support a private member's resolution
calling for the OSC to consult and report back to the Minister of Finance on best
practices on corporate social responsibility and ESG reporting standards. 0 9
At the federal level in Canada, a private member's bill that is currently be-
fore the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development
would require companies in the resource sector that are receiving federal govern-
ment support to "act in a manner consistent with international environmental
best practices and with Canada's commitments to international human rights
standards." 210 Already, the Public Accountability Statements Regulations, 211 which
apply to Canadian banks, insurance companies, and trust and loan companies
with equity of $1 billion or more,212 require the annual filing of a public account-
of climate change and other risks); and Michael J. Kane, Global Survey of Environmental,
Social and Governance Policies with National Governments, International Organizations and
Institutional Investors, online: Association for Sustainable & Responsible Investment in Asia
(ASrIA) <http:llwww.asria.orglnewslpressllib/> (a useful survey of ESG policies recently
compiled by the US Environmental Protection Agency).
206. Global Proxy Watch (31 July 2009), online: David Global Advisors, Inc. <http://www.
davisglobal.com/publications/gpw/index.html>.
207. Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, Building a Better MD&zA - Climate Change
Disclosures (October 2008), online: Chartered Accountants of Canada <http://www.cica.ca/
research-and-guidancelmda-and-business-reportinglmda-publications/item 12846.pdf>.
208. Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), Staff Notice 51-716, "Environmental Reporting"
(2008) 31 OSCB 2223 (29 February 2008).
209. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 39th Parl. 1st sess.,
No. 135 (9 April 2009) at 6051 (Laurel Broten raising a motion regarding corporate reporting).
210. Bill C-300, An Act respecting Corporate Accountabilityfor the Activities ofMining, Oil or Gas
in Developing Countries, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, cl. 3.
211. S.O.R. 2002-133 [PASR].
212. See Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46, s. 459.3(4); Insurance Companies Act, S.C. 1991, c. 4 7, s.
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ability statement. The statement must describe the entity's contribution to Can-
ada's economy and society, including:
3() ...
(c) detailed examples ...
(i) of their participation ... in activities for the purpose of community devel-
opment...,
(ii) of activities undertaken on their behalf during the period by their em-
ployees on a voluntary basis for the purpose of community development,
(iv) of their philanthropic activities ....
(f) and an overview of initiatives undertaken ... to improve access to financial ser-
vices for low-income individuals, senior citizens and disabled persons ..... 213
In each of the above-noted instances, demands for disclosure reflect broader
efforts to influence corporate conduct and governance. This approach is exem-
plified in a 2008 PricewaterhouseCoo'pers report, Recasting the Reporting Model
- How to Simplify and Enhance Communications.14 In advancing the case for
"making sustainability mainstream," the report suggests that "the interdependent
relationship between existing financial data and other data (including social,
customer, supplier and environmental indicators)" must be made clear, and that
doing so "could have a transformational impact on reporting by ensuring that
companies' decision-making and strategy and investors' valuations are based
firmly on a more complete picture of performance. "215
3. REFORMING REGULATORY PARADIGMS
While beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting the shifting role of what
have traditionally been viewed as "economic" or "market" regulators in proac-
tively advancing social goals. For example, Ontario's Green Energy Act216 adds to
489.1(4); and Trust and Loan Companies Act, S.C. 1991, c. 45, s. 444.2(4).
213. PASR, supra note 211, s. 3(1).
214. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Recasting the Reporting Model - How to Simplify and Enhance
Communications: Opportunities for Discussion, (2008) online: <http://pwc.blogs.com/
files/recasting-the-reporting-model---publication.pdf>.
215. Ibid. at 5.
216. Bill 150, An Act to enact the Green Energy Act, 2009 and to build a green economy, to repeal the
Energy Conservation Leadership Act, 2006and the Energy Efficiency Act and to amend other
statues, 1st Sess., 39th Leg., Ontario, 2009 (assented to 14 May 2009), S.O. 2009, c. 12.
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the mandate 6f the Ontario Energy Board the objectives of promoting conser-
vation and renewable energy. By focusing on advancing environmental and
social values and outcomes, the Act fundamentally shifts the focus of regulation
from ensuring cost- and environmentally-efficient supply to regulating the energy.
sector as a contributor to the green economy.
G. SHAREHOLDER-INITIATED APPROACHES
As public norms and expectations shift, corporations may choose to proactively
clarify directors' duties, thereby conditioning the reasonable expectations of
stakeholders. One Canadian example of such an exercise is Magna International
Corporation. In 1984, its shareholders ratified a "Corporate Constitution," which
set out certain principles, including guidelines for the allocation of profits be-
tween employees, shareholders, and management; the allocation of at least 7 per
cent of pre-tax profit for research and development "to ensure [Magna's] long-
term viability"; and the allocation of not more than 2 per cent of pre-tax profit
for "charitable, cultural, educational and political purposes to support the basic
fabric of society."2"' The constitution also provides that any amendments thereto
require shareholder approval with each class of shares (Magna is controlled
through three hundred vote shares) voting separately. Arguably in an effort to
mitigate attempts to unionize plants, Magna also adopted an Employee's Charter,
which focuses on job security, workplace safety, competitive compensation, and
equity/profit participation.1 8
Such initiatives are not unique to Magna. For example, Casio Computer Co.
Ltd. has established a "Charter of Creativity for Casio" and the "Casio Common
Commitment," as described in Casio's 2008 Corporate Report. 219 This Charter
embraces a number of norms, including corporate social responsibility, which is
"said to be a matter of a company fulfilling its responsibility to all of its stake-
holders in all important economic, environmental and social respects."220
217. Magna International Inc., Magna's Corporate Constitution, online: <http://www.magna.coml
magnalen/responsibilitylconstitutiondefault.aspx>.
218. Magna International Inc., Magna International Inc. Employee's Charter, online: <http://www.
magna.comlmagnalenlresponsibilitylcharterdefault.aspx>.
219. Casio Computer Co., Ltd., Casio Corporate Report 2008 (N.p. 2008) at 5, online: <http://
world.casio.comlenv/pdflreport-2OO8/Casio-05-ENG.pdf>.
220. Ibid. at 5.
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A more recent (and widely publicized) example was the initial public offer-
ing of Google. The prospectus included a letter from the founding shareholders
which articulated a number of principles on which Google was based and which
would continue to be maintained after the public offering (through a dual class
share structure, under which the board and executive management team would
control 61.4 per cent of the voting power). Commitments to serving end users,
a long-term focus, and "making the world a better place" were set out in some
detail in an effort to ensure that prospective investors would understand that
"Google is not a conventional company [and it does] not intend to become
one."221 The Google vision was expressed succinctly as follows: "We believe
strongly that in the long term, we will be better served-as shareholders and in
all other ways-by a company that does good things for the world even if we
forego some short-term gains."222
Such disclosure (arguably reinforced by shareholder approval or other vali-
dation) has proven to be consequential in determining director liability. In
Greenlight Capital Inc. v. Stronach,223 a case involving the conduct of Magna's
controlling shareholder in respect of a Magna spin-off company under identical
control, the trial judge found such disclosure to be directly relevant to a deter-
mination of the subjective expectations of the shareholder plaintiff in the con-
text of an oppression claim. Given hbo__rdstetf C, oards ale likcly to b ie d to
deliberately condition stakeholder expectations in order to insulate themselves
in respect of oppression (and other) claims.
In recent years, shareholder activists have tested the limits of corporate law
with by-law proposals that attempt to constrain the authority of boards of direc-
tors. Some commentators have argued that, to the extent that such proposals
attempt to usurp authority for shareholders (who do not owe duties to advance
the interests of the corporation) they should not be allowed. 2 5 Conversely, one
law firm recently proposed that corporations amend advance notice by-laws
governing shareholder proposals to include new, continuous disclosure obliga-
221. Larry Page & Sergey Brin, "An Owner's Manual for Google Shareholders" (2009), online:
<http://investor.google.com/ipo-letter.html>.
222. Ibid. at 6.
223. (2008), 47 B.L.R. (4th) 215.
224. Greenlight CapitalInc. v. Stronach (2006) 22 B.L.R. (4th) 11 at para. 23.
225. Frederick H. Alexander & James D. Honiker, "Power to the Franchise of Fiduciaries" (2008)
33 Del. J. Corp. L. 749.
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tions (beyond those contained under US securities laws) relating to beneficial
ownership interests (intended to prevent activist shareholders from secretly
accumulating a significant interest without disclosure).226 The Dutch Parliament
is currently considering legislation that would codify the recommendations of a
Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee appointed by the Minister
of Finance. The bill would impose substantive responsibilities on institutional
shareholders, such as a requirement on holders of at least 3 per cent of a public
company's voting shares to notify the regulatory authority on whether they
agree with the firm's strategy.227
Lord Myners, the UK Finance Secretary, recently argued that voting rights
might vary in proportion to the length of time that shares are held by the voting
shareholder.228 Such a proposal would follow the French model, under which
ordinary shares double their voting rights if they are held by the same owner for
a period of time specified in the company's charter (typically several years).229
While the focus (attacking "short-termism") is laudable, we are not aware of
evidence that such measures have been effective. The risk, again, is a diminution
in board accountability.
Another approach to extending authority to shareholders would be through
the use of unanimous shareholder agreements (USAs). Though, at common
law, the discretion of directors in respect of their duties cannot be fettered,23 a
USA is a statutory exception to that common law principle. Arguments have
been raised as to whether USAs can be used in public companies. This issue was
226. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, Bulletin, "Beneficial Ownership - By-law Disclosure Proposal"
by Phillip A. Gelston & James C. Woolery (8 September 2008), online: Harvard Law School
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation <http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/files/2008/09/beneficial-ownership-by-law-disclosure-proposal.pdf>; Michael J. de
la Merced, "Shedding Light on Hidden Activists" New York Times (9 September 2008), online:
<http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/09/shedding-light-on-hidden-activists/>.
227. See Global Proxy Watch, supra note 206.
228. "Short of Ideas - The Rights of Shareholders and the Wrong Done to Clients" The
Economist (6 August 2009), online: <http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/
displaystory.cfm?story-id= 14174485>.
229. Tatiana Nenova, "How to Dominate a Firm with Valuable Control? Dual Class Firms
Around the World: Regulation, Security-Voting Structure and Ownership Patterns" (SSRN
Working Paper Series, April 2001), online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid= 1017603>.
230. Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 260 P.2d 823 (Calif. C.A. 1953); Sherman &Ellis,
Inc. v. Indiana Mutual Casuality Co. et al., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1930).
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analyzed in a 1996 discussion paper, which concluded that there is nothing in
the Canadian statute that says USAs cannot be used in the context of a public
corporation. 231 Section 146(1) of the CBCA states:
An otherwise lawful written agreement among all the shareholders of a corporation, or
among all the shareholders and one or more persons who are not shareholders, that
restricts, in whole or in part, the powers of the directors to manage, or supervise the
management of, the business and affairs of the corporation is valid.
2 32
As noted, there is no restriction with respect to the number of shareholders or
type of corporation; if shareholders can reach a sufficient agreement, why should
legislation interfere? Further, section 146(5) of the CBCA states:
To the extent that a unanimous shareholder agreement restricts the powers of the
directors to manage, or supervise the management of, the business and affairs of the
corporation, parties to the unanimous shareholder agreement who are given that
power to manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the
corporation have all the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a director of the corpo-
ration, whether they arise under this Act or otherwise, including any defences avail-
able to the directors, and the directors are relieved of their rights, powers, duties and
liabilities, including their liabilities under section 119, to the same extent.
2 33
The USA would likely have to be created when a company is first set up
and would have to be in place ar rh rim- nf thp initial public offrng; The
prospectus would provide full disclosure and state that the shares are subject to
the USA, which prescribes a different governance framework than the statute.
Share certificates would have to be legended accordingly. Section 146(4) of the
CBCA provides that transferees of shares subject to a USA are deemed to be
parties to the USA if they have notice of the agreement or a "reference to it is
noted conspicuously on the security certificate."234 Thus, as a matter of corporate
law, if the agreement is written, otherwise lawful, and unanimous, the afore-
mentioned sections should be effective in creating a limited access arrangement
between the corporation, directors, and shareholders. It is interesting to consider
whether shareholders exercising some or all of the powers of directors through
231. Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Canada Business Corporations Act: Unanimous
Shareholder Agreements by Penny Becklumb (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2008), online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb9932-e.pdf>.
232. CBCA, supra note 4, s. 146(1) [emphasis added].
233. Ibid., s. 146(5).
234. Ibid., ss. 49(8), 146(4).
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such an agreement would then be subject to statutory duties, as traditionally
understood.
2 35
Shareholders might also impose their will ab initio (or, arguably, at any time)
by including provisions in a company's articles of incorporation that provide
guidance to directors in the exercise of their duties. While, under the CBCA,
this would not serve to relieve directors of their statutory obligations and poten-
tial liability, it might at least colour "reasonable expectations." In contrast, Dela-
ware law generally allows corporate charters to contain "any provision ... for
the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defin-
ing, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the
stockholders ... if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State."236
Moreover, Delaware allows charter provisions that eliminate managerial duty of
care liability in damages.237
Each of the Australia and New Zealand corporation statutes contain a pro-
vision providing for a corporate constitution of a wholly-owned subsidiary to
permit its directors to act in the best interests of the parent company.238 It is
questionable whether this represents a sanctioned departure from shareholder
primacy or simply clarifies the identity of interests.
There is also growing evidence of the potency of shareholder advisory votes,
particularly in respect of executive compensation practices. This is but one mani-
festation of the seminal and growing role of institutional investors in campaign-
ing for improvements in corporate governance and conduct.239 Various voluntary
codes of conduct and business self-regulation have emanated from and are
directed, towards such investors."' John Bogle recently referred to the challenge
235. It is difficult to reconcile a duty of directors to consider stakeholders' interests with the
ability of shareholders to restrict the powers of directors.
236. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2009).
237. Ibid., § 102(b)(7).
238. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.) (Australia), s. 187; Companies Act 1993 (N.Z.), 1993/105, s. 131(2).
239. See e.g. Gordon L. Clark & Tessa Hebb, "Why Should They Care? The Role of Institutional
Investors in the Market for Corporate Global Responsibility" (2005) 37 Envt. Plan. A 2015;
Gordon L. Clark & Darius W6jcik, The Geography of Finance: Corporate Governance in the
GlobalMarketplace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Stephen Davis, Jon
Lukomnik & David Pitt-Watson, The New Capitalists: How Citizen Investors are Reshaping
the Corporate Agenda (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006).
240. See e.g. International Corporate Governance Network, Global Corporate Governance Principles
(2005), online: <http://www.icgn.org/Bjes/icgn-main/pdfs/best-practice/global-principles/
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of establishing a "fiduciary society" based on statutory duties to focus on long-
term investment, appropriate due diligence, and ensuring that "managers/agents
... act in a way that reflects their ethical obligations to society."2 1 Indeed, such




William T. Allen suggested long ago that "anyone trying to understand how our
law deals with corporations must have in mind that they are the locus of many
conflicting claims, and not all of those claims are wholly economic." 243 He noted
how the long-term/short-term distinction preserved the norm of shareholder
oriented property theory, while affording directors considerable latitude to deal
with other groups or institutions that have an interest in, or are affected by, the
corporation. He concluded:
[I]n defining what we suppose a public corporation to be, we implicitly express our
view of the nature and purpose of our social life. Since we do disagree on that, our
law of corporate entities is bound itself to be contentious and controversial. It will be
worked out, not deduced. In this process, efficiency concerns, ideology, and interest
group politics will commingle with history (including our semi-autonomous corpo-
ration law) to produce an answer that will hold for here and now, only to be torn by
some future stress and to be reformulated once more. And so on, and so on, ever-
244more.
In other words, the legal and economic frameworks of corporate govern-
ance are embedded in more basic values, attitudes, and beliefs. As former US
Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren noted, "the law floats on a sea of ethics.
2 z4
2
2005_globalcorporate-governance..principles.pdf>; UNEP Fl, Fiduciary Responsibility,
supra note 154.
241. John C. Bogle, "A Crisis of Ethic Proportions" The Wall Street Journal (20 April 2009) A19.
242. For example, the Australian Treasurer recently announced his government's intention to
amend the Australian Corporations Act to require shareholder approval for termination
payments that exceed average annual base salary. See Rachel Pannett, "Australia to Rein in
Executive Pay; Salaries, 'Golden Handshakes' Would be Put to Shareholders; Overregulation?"
The Wall Street Journal (19 March 2009) C2.
243. William T. Allen, "Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation" (1992) 14
Cardozo L. Rev. 261 at 280.
244. Ibid. at 281.
245. Noel Preston, Understanding Ethics, 3d ed. (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1996) at 21.
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Likewise, Elhauge has forcefully argued that corporate law does and should
confer managerial discretion to consider and, within reason, respond to social
and moral sanctions because "there are residual areas beyond the reach of even
optimally framed legal duties.... "246 Once framed in this manner, the challenge
shifts to one of determining when, absent self-interested conduct, courts should
constrain the exercise of such discretion."'
It has been argued that, in both Peoples and BCE, the Court may have
reached to achieve a desired outcome-one arguably consonant with societal
norms-without carefully articulating the underlying legal reasoning, and this
has led to a diminution both in judicial clarity 48 and directorial accountability.
In this article, some of the existing legal theories that the Court might have
focused on to elaborate the responsibilities of directors have been presented,
along with a consideration of potential legislative and shareholder-initiated re-
forms-any of which might add clarity to the law.
A reader of this article may reasonably assume that clarification of the law
with respect to the role and accountability of directors necessarily involves a
shift towards greater scrutiny of the interests that directors should consider and
also towards directors' commitment to long-term value maximization. While
this reflects the authors' bias, it need not be the case. For example, clarity
with respect to the role and accountability of directors could involve establish-
ing that the role of directors should be a singular focus on maximizing wealth
creation for the benefit of the current shareholders, with the safeguarding of
other interests left to political and social forces.
249
246. Elhauge, supra note 12 at 743.
247. For example, the American Law Institute suggests that courts should sustain decisions to
sacrifice profits for ethical principles when such principles are reasonable because they "have
significant support although less-than-universal acceptance." American Law Institute, supra
note 161 at s. 2.01 (comment (h)). David Engel, however, suggests a more stringent
standard, based on broad social consensus. David L. Engel, "An Approach to Corporate
Social Responsibility" (1979) 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1 at 27-34.
248. Ian Lee points out that the Court's approach in Peoples "obscures the choice actually faced
by the court and the normative considerations relevant to that choice," adding that, "[i]n this
way, it is an example of the kind of reasoning that realist scholars persuasively criticized in
the last century." Lee, supra note 48 at 220, n. 37. See also Felix S. Cohen "Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach" (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 809.
249. See e.g. Reich, supra note 101.
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Ultimately, the determination of proper corporate purpose, duties of direc-
tors, and directors' discretion and accountability depends on an understanding
of the role of the corporation in our society. Is a legal construct that has and
continues to hold the potential to transform our world really one that we want
to hinder? If not, how best can we focus the role of directors (or others assigned
with legal duties and accountability) on ensuring that corporations generate
wealth within the context of broader societal values? Equally, how do we focus
the "watchful eye," referred to by President Obama, to ensure an effective over-
sight role and ultimate responsibility for wealth distribution?
Never before have the duties owed by directors attracted such political cur-
rency. Sadly, the Supreme Court of Canada has now missed two opportunities
to address these issues in the context of corporate law. Perhaps, in venturing
into the realm of social responsibility, it was "being too far ahead" of its time-
if so, only by not going deep. The theoretical basis for a shift to directors taking
a broader and longer-term view of corporate responsibilities is compelling.
There is no shortage of legal theories by which such conduct could be encour-
aged or required. Hopefully, others will soon provide greater clarity.
